Riley v. Kennedy
This dispute arises out of Alabama election laws. In 2005, there was a vacant seat on the Mobile County Commission. Kennedy, a state legislator, sued Riley, the Governor of Alabama, alleging that Riley must order a special election to fill the vacant set.
In 1985 Alabama had passed a law providing for special elections when a seat on a county commission became vacant with more than twelve months left in the term. Previously, the governor had appointed people to fill vacated seats. In 1987, Samuel Jones was elected to a county seat by special election. In 1988, however, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the 1985 law was invalid under the Alabama Constitution because it was a “local” law that conflicted with the “general” law that gave the governor the appointment power. To avoid conflict, the governor confirmed Jones’s election by appointing him to the commission. In 2004, Alabama passed a law providing that vacancies on county commissions were to be filled by gubernatorial appointment “unless a local law authorizes a special election.”
In the current case, Kennedy argued that the 2004 law had revived the invalidated 1985 law and that Riley should order a special election to fill the seat on the Mobile County Commission. The Alabama trial court agreed with Kennedy and ordered the special election. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 2004 law only applied prospectively to new local laws authorizing special elections. Therefore, the Governor still had the pre-1985 power to appoint people to vacant seats. Governor Riley then appointed Juan Chastang to the Mobile County Commission. Kennedy then sued in federal district court, asking the court to stop Riley from appointing Chastang.
The district court held that, under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, changes to voting procedures must be “precleared” by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to ensure that they do not have the effect or purpose of denying racial minorities the right to vote. Therefore, the 1988 and 2005 Alabama Supreme Court decisions had to be “precleared” by the DOJ before they took effect. Since the DOJ had refused to preclear either decision, the court reasoned that the 1987 special elections had legitimated and precleared the original 1985 law, therefore creating a “baseline practice” of special elections. Therefore, Riley’s appointment of Chastang was unlawful under federal law.
Questions Presented:
1. Whether the decision of a covered jurisdiction’s highest court that a precleared State law is unconstitutional and, thereby, invalid as a matter of State law is a change that affects voting that must be precleared before it can be enforced.
2. Whether the preclearance of a trial court’s ruling that affects voting while that ruling is on appeal and subject to possible reversal establishes a baseline such that the reversal of that decision is a change that must be precleared before it may be enforced.
