New York Board of Elections v. Torres
The plaintiffs, a group of people who have been unsuccessful in securing party nominations to become candidates for Supreme Court Justices in New York State, sued the New York State Board of Elections and its commissioners pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that New York's electoral scheme violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In particular, plaintiffs claim that the system violates the First Amendment's guarantee of political association as to Supreme Court Justice candidates and the voters wishing to support them. Plaintiffs also claim that the scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it places unequal burdens on the right to vote.
In a nutshell, people who want to become a candidate for Supreme Court Justice must be nominated and approved at a party convention. Plaintiffs alleged that it is virtually impossible to become a candidate without the backing of party bosses. The district court issued an injunction, concluding that plaintiffs demonstrated a clear likelihood of success on their First Amendment claims.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. It first concluded that New York must afford voters and candidates the right to associate through and in the judicial nominating process, and further, that the First Amendment affords candidates and voters a "realistic opportunity to participate in the nominating process, and to do so free from burdens that are both severe and unnecessary to further a compelling state interest." It further concluded that, while categorical race and sex-based exclusions violate the associational rights of voters and candidates, exclusions that result from "a complex of otherwise facially valid regulations" also may offend the First Amendment. The Second Circuit rejected the State's argument that a nominating convention was a per se constitutional form of selecting candidates, and further, that the associational rights of the democratic and republican political parties justified the state nominating scheme.
Questions Presented:
1. In American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974), this Court held that it is “too plain for argument” that a State may require intraparty competition to be resolved either by convention or primary. Did the Second Circuit run afoul of White by mandating a primary in lieu of a party convention for the nomination of candidates for New York State trial judge?
2. What is the appropriate scope of First Amendment rights of voters and candidates within the arena of intraparty competition, and particularly where the State has chosen a party convention instead of a primary as the nominating process?
(a) Did the Second Circuit err, as a threshold matter, in applying this Court’s decision in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) and related ballot access cases, which were concerned with the dangers of “freezing out” minor party and non-party candidates, to internal party contests?
(b) If Storer does apply, did the Second Circuit run afoul of Storer in holding that voters and candidates are entitled to a “realistic opportunity to participate” in the party’s nomination process as measured by whether a “challenger candidate” could compete effectively against the party-backed candidate?
3. In Bachur v. Democratic National Party, 836 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1987) and Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C.. Cir. 1975) (en banc) the Fourth and D.C. Circuits applied a rational basis balancing test to weigh the coequal, but competing First Amendment rights of political parties in setting delegate selection rules against those of voters and candidates. Did the Second Circuit err in preferring the First Amendment rights of voters and candidates by first determining that New York’s convention system severely burdened those rights and then subjecting the party’s rights to strict scrutiny review?
