Duke Law School

Program in Public Law

United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.

Atlantic Research Corporation (Atlantic) sued the United States, seeking partial reimbursement for the costs it incurred in an environmental cleanup, based on the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (“CERCLA”). Atlantic retrofitted rocket motors for the United States from 1981 through 1986 at a facility in Arkansas. The work included using high-pressure water spray to remove rocket propellant, which was burned once it was removed. Residue from burnt rocket fuel contaminated the site’s soil and groundwater. Atlantic voluntarily investigated and cleaned up the contamination before anyone brought a CERCLA action forcing them to do so, incurring costs in the process. Atlantic then sued the United States for partial recovery of costs under CERCLA sections 107(a) and 113(f). While this law suit was pending, the Supreme Court held in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services Corp. that a suit for recovery under section 113(f) could only be brought "during or following" a CERCLA enforcement action. The district court dismissed Atlantic's law suit, holding that section 113(f) was unavailable to Atlantic and that it could not rely on section 107(a) alone.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 107 of CERCLA permits one liable party to recover costs
advanced, beyond its equitable share, from another liable party under section 107. Overruling its own precedent, the court held that it no longer makes sense to view section 113 as a liable party’s exclusive remedy because liable parties like Atlantic are foreclosed from using section 113 because they cleaned up before, rather than “during or following,” a CERCLA enforcement action. Allowing Atlantic to rely upon section 107 to try to recover its cleanup costs exceeding its own equitable share thus gives incentive to liable parties to clean up sites before an enforcement action is commenced.

Question Presented:

Whether a party that is potentially responsible for the cost of cleaning up property contaminated by hazardous substances under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq., but that does not satisfy the requirements for bringing an action for contribution under Section 113(f) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9613(f), may bring an action against another potentially responsible party under Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a).

Decision under Review

Supreme Court Opinion