Ayers v. Belmontes
Belmontes sued the warden of his prison for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his death sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the jury instruction did not specify that the jury must consider all mitigating factors, including his probable future behavior during life imprisonment, when determining his sentence. California had convicted Belmontes of first degree murder. During the penalty phase of the trial, Belmontes presented extensive evidence that he would probably adapt well to incarceration. The judge instructed the jury according to the then-standard model jury instructions, which at that time included a "catch-all" provision--factor k--instructing the jury to consider “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.” The judge specifically declined the defendant's request to specify to the jury that it must consider all relevant mitigating evidence when deciding whether to impose the death penalty, as is required by the Eighth Amendment of the constitution. In Skipper v. South Carolina, the Supreme Court held that a jury must consider mitigating evidence that relates to a defendant’s probable future behavior, especially the likelihood that he would not pose a future danger if spared but incarcerated for life.
Belmontes exhausted his appeals in state court, and then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court, which was denied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, granting Belmontes' petition with respect to the penalty phase of his trial. The court held that "unadorned" factor k, without further clarification about the types of mitigating evidence that the jury must consider, suggested to the jury that it could not consider probable future conduct in prison, and that the instruction had a reasonable probability of affecting the decision to impose a death sentence. Although the United States Supreme Court had found the California factor k to be constitutionally sufficient in Boyde v. California, the Ninth Circuit held that Boyde did not control this case because the defendant in that case did not present evidence tending to show probable future conduct in prison. Thus unadorned factor k is constitutionally sufficient for mitigating evidence relating to past conduct, but not for mitigating evidence that is "forward looking."
The warden appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the grounds that Boyde confirmed that factor (k) is constitutional, and additionally claimed that the death sentence should stand under United State Supreme Court case Teague v. Lane, which makes “new rules” unavailable for use in petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. The warden argues that modifying Boyde created a new rule after Belmontes exhausted his direct appeals, so the Ninth Circuit’s holding cannot be applied to Belmontes’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In 2005, the Supreme Court granted the petition, vacated the judgment, and remanded so that the Ninth Circuit could reconsider the decision in light of its decision in Brown v. Payton. The Ninth Circuit concluded that Payton did not control this case because it was decided under a different standard of review.
Question Presented:
1. Does Boyde confirm the constitutional sufficiency of California's "unadorned factor (k)" instruction where a defendant presents mitigating evidence of his background and character which relates to, or has a bearing on, his future prospects as a life prisoner?
2. Does the Ninth Circuit's holding, that California's "unadorned factor (k)" instruction is constitutionally inadequate to inform jurors they may consider "forward-looking" mitigation evidence constitute a "new rule" under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)?Decisions under Review:
