Lawrence v. Florida
Lawrence sued Florida for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming thirteen counts of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Florida had convicted Lawrence of premeditated murder in the first degree and sentenced him to death. Lawrence exhausted his appeals and post-conviction relief in the state courts, and then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.
The district court dismissed Lawrence’s petition as barred by the one year statute of limitations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Lawrence had no valid exemption from the statute of limitation. First, it upheld the district court ruling that the statute of limitations ran while Lawrence waited for the Supreme Court’s decision on his petition for a writ of certiorari on an earlier matter during his trial. Second, it denied equitable tolling of the statute of limitations because Lawrence did not prove “extraordinary circumstances.” The court rejected Lawrence's argument that the incompetant state-supplied attorney who advised Lawrence about his petition was a "state impediment to filing" that causes an exception to the filing requirement, and that the division in the circuit courts on whether the statute of limitations is tolled pending a certiori decision was an extraordinary circumstance.
Lawrence appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the statute of limitations for his writ of habeas corpus should not have tolled while he waited to see if the Supreme Court would hear his case. He also contends that the confusion around the statute of limitations and the incompetence of his state-appointed lawyer were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control, which allow the court to ignore the statute of limitations.
Questions Presented:
1. There is a split in the circuits about whether the one-year period of limitations is tolled for "[t]he time during which a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment of claim is pending . . . . " Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d) (2). Where a defendant facing death has pending a United States Supreme Court
certiorari petition to review the validity of the state's denial of his claims for state postconviction relief, does the defendant have an
application pending which tolls the 2244 (d)(2) statute of limitations?
2. Does the confusion around the statute of limitations–as evidenced by the split in the circuits–constitute an "extraordinary circumstance,"
entitling a defendant to equitable tolling during the time when his claim is being considered by the U.S. Supreme Court on certiorari?
3. And in the second alternative, do the special circumstance where counsel advising the defendant as to the statute of limitations was registry
counsel–a species of state actor–under the monitoring supervision of Florida Courts, with a statutory duty to file appropriate motions in a timely
manner, constitute an "extraordinary circumstance" beyond the defendant's control such that the doctrine of equitable tolling should operate to save
his petition?
