Fry v. Pliler
John Fry was convicted of two counts of first degree murder in California Superior Court. After his conviction was affirmed by the California higher courts, he filed a federal habeas petition, which was denied by the district court. Fry argued that the state court had improperly excluded testimony from a woman who would have testified to overhearing a conversation involving her cousin indicating that the cousin had committed a double homicide--possibly the ones for which Fry was convicted.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Fry's petition, holding that the state court had committed constitutional error in excluding the evidence, but that the error was harmless. Fry argued that the effect of the error should be measured using the test from Chapman v. California, under which the state must prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Instead, the Ninth Circuit applied the harmless error test from Brecht v. Abrahamson, whether "the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict," because the Brecht standard is applied "uniformly" in all habeas cases.
Question Presented:
If constitutional error in a state trial is not recognized by the judiciary until the case ends up in federal court under 28 U.S.C. ยง 2254, is the prejudicial impact of the error assessed under the standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), or that enunciated inBrecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993)? Does it matter which harmless error standard is employed? And, if the Brecht standard applies, does the petitioner or the State bear the burden of persuasion on the question of prejudice?
