Burton v. Stewart
Burton sued the warden of his prison for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the United States Supreme Court case Blakely v. Washington should have applied to his sentence. The state of Washington convicted Burton of first degree rape, burglary, and robbery. Burton committed so many severe crimes at the same time that his rape conviction did not add to Washington’s standard sentence for a single criminal event, because the burglary and robbery alone were enough to require the maximum sentence. Because using the standard state sentence left the rape unpunished, the trial judge used his discretion to impose an exceptional sentence for the rape, which did add onto the overall sentence.
Burton exhausted his direct appeals, and then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied his petition for reasons unrelated to the issues before the Supreme Court. After that decision, the Supreme Court issued its Blakely opinion, which held that only the jury can make findings that add to the length of prison sentences. Burton appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the grounds that his sentence is unconstitutional under Blakely because the jury made no findings about the propriety of his exceptional sentence for the rape. The court of appeals upheld the district court ruling, and held that Blakely was a “new rule” under the Supreme Court caseTeague v. Lane. New rules are unavailable for collateral attacks like petitions for writs of habeas corpus if the court created the new rule after a person’s direct appeals are exhausted.
Burton appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that Blakely is not a new rule, but rather a rule dictated by the Supreme Court case Apprendi v. New Jersey. Holdings dictated by other holdings can be used in collateral attacks. He also argued thatBlakely, even if it is a new rule, is essential to a fundamentally fair trial. New rules that are necessary for fair trials can be used in collateral attacks.
Questions Presented:
(1) Is the holding in Blakely a new rule or is it dictated by Apprendi?
(2) If Blakely is a new rule, does its requirement that facts resulting in an enhanced statutory maximum be proved beyond a reasonable doubt apply retroactively?
