Garcetti v. Ceballos
Ceballos, an employee at the office of the Los Angelos County District Attorney, has sued two employees of the office and Gil Garcetti, the District Attorney, under 42 U.S.C. ยง 1983, alleging that the three retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. A defense attorney had told Ceballos, who was employed as a calendar deputy, that a sheriff might have lied in a search warrant affidavit that had been filed as evidence in a murder case. Ceballos investigated the matter himself, concluded that the sheriff had misrepresented facts in the affidavit, and sent a memorandum reporting the misrepresentation to a deputy District Attorney. The memorandum recommended that the case be dismissed, which the deputy declined to do. Ceballos later testified for the defense about the validity of the subpoena and also submitted the memorandum he had sent to the deputy.
Ceballos alleged that the three individuals retaliated against him on several instances for his submission of the memorandum, including asking him to transfer to another branch or to accept being re-assigned to filing misdemeanors, not allowing him to work on future murder cases, and in denying him a promotion.
The individuals claimed that they were immune from liability. Ceballos argued that his submission of the memorandum should be considered free speech protected under the First Amendment, and therefore that the individuals had violated his constitutional rights and could not claim immunity. The district court granted a motion for summary judgment on behalf of the individuals, finding no protected First Amendment speech interest in the memorandum because Ceballos wrote it in a purely job-related capacity and not in his capacity as a citizen. and in his capacity as a citizen. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the memorandum was entitled to First Amendment protection because it was on a matter of public concern and, in this matter, Ceballos’ speech interest outweighed the government’s interests in promoting workplace efficiency and avoiding workplace disruption.
Question Presented:
1. Should a public employee's purely job-related speech, expressed strictly pursuant to the duties of employment, be cloaked with First Amendment
protection simply because it touches on a matter of public concern, or should First Amendment protection also require the speech to be engaged in "as a citizen," in accordance with this Court's
holdings in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)?
2. Is immediate review by this Court necessary to address the growing inter-circuit conflict on the question of whether a public employee's purely job-related speech is constitutionally protected,
especially where the lack of uniformity dramatically impacts the ability of all public employers to effectively manage their respective agencies?
