U.S. v. Booker, U.S. v. Fanfan, Consol.
These cases were consolidated for expedited briefing and hearing before the Supreme Court. Both involve the question whether, after Blakely v. Washington, the federal sentencing guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment. Blakely invalidated under the Sixth Amendment a Washington state statute that authorized a judge to impose a sentence above the “standard range” set forth in the sentencing statute if the judge found any aggravating factors that justify such an upward departure. The Supreme Court had already held in Apprendi v. New Jersey that “other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” In Blakely, the Court clarified that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. . . . In other words, the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts ‘which the law makes essential to the punishment,’ and the judge exceeds his proper authority.”
Booker was convicted by a jury of possessing with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base, for which a federal statute prescribes a minimum sentence of 10 years in prison and a maximum sentence of life. At sentencing, a federal district court judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant (1) had distributed 566 grams over and above the 92.5 grams that the jury found and (2) had obstructed justice. Under the federal sentencing guidelines, the judge’s additional quantity finding increased the defendant’s base offense level from 32 to 36. The effect, together with that of the enhancement that the guidelines prescribe for obstruction of justice, was to place Booker in a sentencing range of 360 months (30 years) to life. Booker appealed, challenging the sentence on the ground that the federal sentencing guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment insofar as they permit the judge to find facts that determine the defendant’s sentencing range. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the federal sentencing guidelines, as applied in this case, violated the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Blakely.
Fanfan was convicted by jury of a single charge of conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine hydrochloride. At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution argued that Fanfan should be sentenced for the possession and sale of crack cocaine that was, pursuant to an earlier ruling, outside the scope of the charged conspiracy. The prosecution presented testimony regarding cocaine base, including hearsay evidence that Fanfan had sold cocaine base to a cooperating co-defendant in the past. The prosecution sought a substantial increase in Fanfan’s sentence on the basis of that evidence. Fanfan objected that, under Blakely, if the prosecution sought the harsher punishment for a cocaine base crime, it should have charged such a crime in the indictment and proven it to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court judge agreed that Blakelyprecluded it from increasing Fanfan’s sentence based on any facts other than those found by the jury. Accordingly, the judge concluded that no aspect of the sentence could be premised on the allegation that Fanfan had possessed cocaine base.
Questions Presented:
1. Whether the Sixth Amendment is violated by the imposition of an enhanced sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines based on the
sentencing judge's determination of a fact (other than a prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant.
2. If the answer to the first question is "yes," the following question is presented: whether, in a case in which the Guidelines would require the
court to find a sentence-enhancing fact, the Sentencing Guidelines as a whole would be inapplicable, as a matter of severability analysis, such that
the sentencing court must exercise its discretion to sentence the defendant within the maximum and minimum set by statute for the offense of
conviction.
Decisions under Review:
United States v. Booker
United States v. Fanfan (no opinion available; unpublished district court opinion)
