Rumsfeld v. Padilla
Jose Padilla, an American citizen, flew on his American passport from Pakistan, via Switzerland, to Chicago's O'Hare International Airport, where he was arrested by FBI agents pursuant to a warrant in connection with a grand jury investigation of the terrorist attacks of September 11. Padilla was brought to New York, where he was detained in a maximum-security prison. Donna R. Newman, his appointed attorney, moved to vacate the warrant. The government then notified the court that the President had issued an Order designating Padilla as an enemy combatant and directing Secretary Rumsfeld to detain him. Padilla was taken into custody by Department of Defense (DOD) personnel and transported from New York to the high-security Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina. Newman, unable to secure Padilla's signature on a habeas corpus petition, filed one on his behalf as "next friend." Regarding the petition, the district court determined, in part, that (1) Secretary Rumsfeld was a proper respondent and the district court had jurisdiction over him, and (2) the Constitution and statutory law give the President authority to detain American citizens as enemy combatants. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on the first issue but reversed on the second. The court concluded that Padilla's detention was not authorized by Congress, and absent such authorization, the President does not have the power under Article II of the Constitution to detain as an enemy combatant an American citizen seized on American soil outside a zone of combat.
Questions Presented:
1. Whether the President has authority as Commander in Chief and in light of Congress's Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, to seize and detain a United
States citizen in the United States based on a determination by the President that he is an enemy combatant who is closely associated with al Qaeda and has engaged in hostile and war-like acts, or
whether 18 U.S.C. ยง 4001(a) precludes that exercise of Presidential authority.
2. Whether the district court has jurisdiction over the proper respondent to the amended habeas petition.
