McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n (the BCRA cases)
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) was enacted to protect national elections from some of the worst effects of "big money" campaign contributions. In particular, BCRA was designed to address the corrupting influence of "soft money" and the proliferation of "issue ads" that bypass federal regulations. Shortly after BCRA was enacted, Senator McConnell and many other organizations filed eleven separate complaints in the district court challenging the constitutionality of various provisions in BCRA. A three-judge panel of the district court upheld BCRA in part and invalidated it in part, holding that (1) political parties and candidates can be banned from using "soft money" for federal election activities, but not for other political activities; (2) the statutory definition of "electioneering communications" is valid; (3) the cost of third-party issue ads that are coordinated with the campaigns of federal candidates can validly be considered as contributions to those campaigns; (4) the ban on party donations to tax-exempt entities is invalid; (5) "soft money" can not be used for issue ads that clearly identify a candidate; (6) labor unions, corporations, and national banks are required to pay for issue ads from separately segregated funds; (7) the prohibition on political donations by minors is invalid; and (8) the requirement that broadcasters disclose records of requests for air time for political ads is invalid. In upholding several provisions of the BCRA, the district court emphasized Congress's authority to protect the integrity of federal elections and prevent corruption of federal office-holders.
Questions Presented:
1. Whether the district court erred by upholding portions of the "soft money" provision (section 101) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 166 Stat. 81,
because it constitutes an invalid exercise of Congress' power to regulate elections under Article I, Section 4, of the Constitution; violates the First Amendment or the equal protection component
of the Fifth Amendment; or is unconstitutionally vague.
2. Whether the district court erred by upholding portions of the "electioneering communications" provisions (sections 201, 203, 204, and 311), of BCRA, because they violate the First Amendment or
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, or are unconstitutionally vague.
3. Whether the district court erred by holding nonjusticiable challenges to, and upholding, portions of the "advance notice" provisions of BCRA (sections 201 and 212), because they violate the
First Amendment.
4. Whether the district court erred by holding nonjusticiable challenges to, and upholding, the "coordination" provisions of BCRA (sections 202, 211, and 214), because they violate the First
Amendment.
5. Whether the district court erred by holding nonjusticiable challenges to, and upholding, the "attack ad" provision of BCRA (section 305), because it violates the First Amendment.
