Banks v. Cockrell
Banks was convicted in Texas state court and sentenced to death for the 1980 murder of a 16-year-old boy. He filed three unsuccessful habeas corpus petitions in state court. In 1996, Banks' attorneys confirmed that one of the prosecution's chief witnesses was a paid informant who received $200 for helping locate the murder weapon, a fact that was not disclosed at trial. The other witness claimed that large parts of his testimony were false and that he testified to get larceny charges against him dropped. Using this new information, Banks filed a habeas petition in federal court, alleging that prosecutors deliberately withheld important evidence about its two key witnesses. The federal district judge ruled in favor of Banks, finding that he had proven the elements of a claim under Brady v. Maryland: evidence was suppressed, it was favorable to the accused, and it was material to guilt or punishment. The court determined that it was unlikely that a jury with all the facts would have sentenced Banks to death. The court of appeals reversed, rejecting Banks' Brady claim on procedural grounds and also determining that one witness' paid informant status would not have been likely to change the jury's death sentence. The appeals court considered each piece of mitigating evidence separately, rather than weighing the cumulative error, and found it unlikely that the admission of any one piece would have reduced Banks' sentence. Therefore, the death sentence was allowed to stand.
Questions Presented:
1. Did the 5th Circuit err in rejecting Banks' claim under Brady v. Maryland, that the prosecution suppressed material witness impeachment evidence that prejudiced him in the penalty phase
of his trial, on the grounds that: (a) the evidence supporting the claim was procedurally defaulted, notwithstanding the fact that there was no reasonable basis for concluding that counsel for
Banks could have discovered the suppressed evidence prior to or during that trial or state post-conviction proceedings; and (b) the suppressed evidence was immaterial to Banks' death sentence,
where the panel neglected to consider that the trial prosecutors viewed the evidence to be of "utmost importance" to showing a capital sentence was appropriate?
2. Did the 5th Circuit act contrary to Strickland v. Washington and Williams v. Taylor when it weighed each item of mitigating evidence separately and concluded that no single
category would have brought a different result at sentencing without weighing the impact of the evidence collectively?
3. Did the 5th Circuit act contrary to Harris v. Nelsen and Withrow v. Williams in holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) does not apply to habeas proceedings because "evidentiary
hearings" in those proceedings are not similar to civil trials?
