Schiedler v. NOW & Operation Rescue v. NOW (consolidated)
The National Organization for Women (NOW) represents a class of women who have used or would use the services of an abortion clinic. In 1986, NOW sued the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN), a group of anti-abortion activists, alleging, among other things, that their protest tactics violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Hobbs Act, which makes it a crime to obtain property through extortion. An initial trip to the Supreme Court resulted in a remand to the district court for a trial of the extortion claims. A jury found that PLAN had committed numerous acts of extortion and awarded damages; the district court issued a permanent nationwide injunction prohibiting PLAN from conducting blockades, trespassing, damaging property, or committing acts of violence at abortion clinics. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) that RICO authorizes private plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief, and (2) that interfering with intangible property, such as the right to conduct business, violates the Hobbs Act. Another trip to the Supreme Court resulted in a reversal of both verdicts. In NOW II, The Supreme Court held that PLAN did not obtain property through extortion under the meaning of the Hobbs Act, and the lack of extortion made the nationwide injunction under RICO void.
On remand, the Seventh Circuit decided that the United States Supreme Court, due to the narrow scope of its question presented, did not consider whether four acts committed by PLAN, involving “acts or threats of physical violence to any person or property,” could support a claim under the Hobbs Act. The Seventh Circuit remanded the question to the district court, with instructions to examine these four acts and determine if a claim under the Hobbs Act could be sustained, thereby allowing for an injunction narrowly tailored to prevent the future commission of types of acts.
Questions Presented:
1) Whether the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, on remand, disregarded the Supreme Court's mandate by holding that "all" of the predicate acts supporting the
jury's finding of a RICO violation were not reversed, that the "judgment that petitioners violated RICO" was not necessarily reversed, and that the "injunction issued by the District Court" might
not need to be vacated?
(2) Whether the 7th Circuit correctly held, in conflict with decision of the 6th and 9th Circuits, that the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. sec. 1951(a), can be read to punish acts or threats of physical
violence against "any person or property" in a manner that "in any way or degree . . . affects commerce," even if such acts or threats of violence are wholly unconnected to either extortion or
robbery?
(3) Whether injunctive relief is available in a private civil action for treble damages brought under RICO, 18 U.S.C. sec. 1964(c)?
