Davis v. Washington Hammon v. Indiana
The Supreme Court granted review of both cases, to be heard in tandem. Both cases involve an issue that follows from Crawford v. Washington, in which the Court held that testimonial statements in a criminal trial are prohibited by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment if the defendant was not able to cross examine the person who made the statement.
Davis was charged with violating a domestic no-contact order after police responded to a 911 call from Michelle McCottrey. While on the telephone, McCottrey identified Davis as her assailant and told the operator that Davis had used his fists to beat her and that he had left her residence moments earlier. McCottrey did not testify at Davis' trial. The state submitted the recording of her 911 call as evidence linking Davis to McCottrey's injuries, over the objections of Davis. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 911 call in this case was not a "testimonial" statement under the Crawford analysis. First, an emergency 911 call is not of the same nature as an in-custody interrogation by police, so is not the functional equivalent of uncross-examined, in-court testimony. Second, the purpose of a 911 call is generally not to "bear witness." If the purpose of the call was for help or rescue, as in this case, it does not resemble the specific type of out-of-court statement with which Crawford is concerned.
Hammon was charged with domestic battery after police responded to a call from the Hammon residence. While being questioned, Mrs. Hammon told an officer that her husband had thrown her to the ground and beaten her. Mrs. Hammon did not testify at Mr. Hammon’s trial, but the officer testified as to what Mrs. Hammon told him that night. Mr. Hammon’s attorney objected to this testimony, but it was allowed under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, defining "testimonial" statements as those where a principal motive of either the person making the statement or the person receiving it is to preserve it for future use in legal proceedings. Thus, statements to investigating officers in response to the officer's general initial inquiries are nontestimonial, but statements made for the purpose of preserving the accounts of potential witnesses are testimonial. In this case, the officer's motives for questioning Mrs. Hammon were to assess and secure the situation; neither the officer nor Mrs. Hammon intended to preserve Mrs. Hammon's statement as future testimony; the statements were not “testimonial” and therefore were admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule.
Question Presented:
Whether an alleged victim’s statements to a 911 operator naming her assailant — admitted as “excited utterances” under a
jurisdiction’s hearsay law — constitute “testimonial” statements subject to the Confrontation Clause restriction enunciated in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004).
Decisions under Review:
Davis v. Washington
Hammon v. Indiana
