Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad v. White
White sued her employer, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad, for sexual harassment under Title VII. White was hired to be a fork lift operator for Burlington. She was the only woman working on the railroad during that period. After some time operating the fork lift, White complained to company officials about being sexually harassed by her foreman. Shortly after she complaint, White was told that other Burlington employees were resentful of her because she was a junior employee and operating the forklift, since that was considered an easier and cleaner job reserved for senior employees. White was then transferred to a standard track laborer position. While working as a track laborer, White had a conflict with some other employees regarding transportation to a site. White was suspended with no pay. This suspension came seven days after White filed her second sex discrimination claim. Burlington investigated the suspension, found that White was not “insubordinate,” and ultimately reinstated with full back pay. White persisted with her sexual harassment claims, and after trial, a jury awarded White compensatory damages and attorneys fees. Burlington then moved for a judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), which the trial court denied.
The United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of a JMOL. The issue was whether White’s temporary suspension and demotion from forklift operator was an “adverse employment action” under Title VII. Burlington argued that the Sixth Circuit should adopt the “ultimate employment decision” doctrine, which provides that certain short-lived changes to one’s job are not discrimination under Title VII if the changes could have been caused by a variety of factors. The Sixth Circuit rejected the doctrine, holding that Title VII can be applied to adverse employment actions less serious than termination. The court found that White’s temporary suspension, lack of pay for a month, and her job change were sufficiently adverse to be a violation of Title VII.
Question Presented:
Whether an employer may be held liable for retaliatory discrimination under Title VII for any “materially adverse change in the terms of employment”
(including a temporary suspension rescinded by the employer with full back pay or an inconvenient reassignment, as the court below held); for any
adverse treatment that was “reasonably likely to deter” the plaintiff from engaging in protected activity (as the Ninth Circuit holds); or only for
an “ultimate employment decision” (as two other courts of appeals hold).
