Rompilla v. Beard
Rompilla was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Pennsylvania. After the conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal, Rompilla filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied relief as to the conviction and rejected Rompilla's argument that the state trial court was required to instruct the jury that a life sentence means life without parole; however, the district court granted the habeas petition as to the sentence, concluding that Rompilla's counsel had failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. The district court ordered that Rompilla be released unless he was either re-sentenced to life imprisonment or a new penalty phase was held. On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's finding that Rompilla had ineffective assistance of counsel and affirmed that the state trial court was not required to give a life-without-parole instruction to the jury.
Questions Presented:
Questions related to the Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U.S. 154 (1994), issue:
1. Does Simmons require a life-without-parole instruction where: the only alternative to a death sentence under state law is life without possibility of parole; the jury asks the court three
questions about parole and rehabilitation during eleven hours of penalty-phase deliberations; the prosecution's evidence is that the defendant is a violent recidivist who functions poorly outside
prison and who killed someone three months after being paroled from a lengthy prison term; and the prosecutor argues that the defendant is a frightening repeat offender and cold-blooded killer who
learned from prior convictions that he should kill anyone who might identify him?
2. Is the state court decision denying the Simmons claim "contrary to" and/or an "unreasonable application" of clearly established Supreme Court law where the state court held that, a history of
violent convictions is irrelevant to the jury's assessment of future dangerousness, while ignoring the jury's questions about parole eligibility and rehabilitation and the prosecution's actual
evidence and argument?
Questions related to counsel's ineffective assistance at capital sentencing:
1. Has a defendant received effective representation at capital sentencing where counsel does not review prior conviction records counsel knows the prosecution will use in aggravation, and where
those records would have provided mitigating evidence regarding the defendant's traumatic childhood and mental health impairments?
2. Has a defendant received effective representation at capital sentencing where counsel's background mitigation investigation is limited to conversations with a few family members; where the few
people with whom counsel spoke indicated to counsel that they did not know much about the defendant and could not help with background mitigation; where other sources of background information,
including other family members, prior conviction records, prison records, juvenile court records and school records, were available but ignored by counsel; and where the records and other family
members would have provided compelling mitigating evidence about the defendant's traumatic childhood, mental retardation and psychological disturbances?
3. Does counsel's ineffectiveness warrant habeas relief under AEDPA where the state court sought to excuse counsel's failure to obtain any records about the defendant's history by saying the
records contained some information that was "not entirely helpful," by saying counsel hired mental health experts (even though those experts did not do any background investigation and never saw
the records), and by saying counsel spoke to some family members (even though those family members told counsel they knew little about the defendant and could not help with mitigation); and where
the state court did not even try to address counsel's failure to interview other family members (who knew the defendant's mitigating history) or counsel's complete failure to investigate the
aggravation that the prosecution told counsel it would use?
