Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services
The discovery of hazardous contamination of its land prompted Aviall Services to notify the local authority and begin a voluntary cleanup of the contamination. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), § 113(f)(1), allows plaintiffs in some situations to recoup some of the cleanup costs from past owners of the land or other “potentially responsible parties” (PRPs). Aviall sought contribution for the cleanup costs by bringing a § 113 suit against Cooper Industries, the former owner of the land and an undisputed PRP. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Cooper, interpreting the ambiguous language of § 113 as limiting contribution suits to plaintiffs faced with a civil or administrative action under CERCLA § 106 or §107, and not in instances where the cleanup actions were taken voluntarily. The Fifth Circuit affirmed this judgment, but Aviall was granted a rehearing en banc to present its argument before the entire circuit court. Reversing its prior decision, the court en banc made a more “common sense” interpretation of the language of § 113 in light of relevant case law and CERCLA’s goal of encouraging voluntary cleanups.
Question Presented:
Whether a private party who has not been the subject of an underlying civil action pursuant to CERCLA Sections 106 or 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606 or 9607, may
bring an action seeking contribution pursuant to CERCLA Section 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1), to recover costs spent voluntarily to clean up properties contaminated by hazardous substances.
