1. B.A. in Public Policy Studies, Duke University, 2000; Candidate for J.D., Duke University School of Law, 2007; The author would like to thank Professor Erwin Chemerinsky for his guidance in the development of this iBrief.
2. See Jeffrey S. Nestler, Comment, The Underprivileged Profession: The Case for Supreme Court Recognition of the Journalist’s Privilege, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 201, 201-02 (2005); Robert Zelnick, Journalists and Confidential Sources, 19 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 541, 541 (2005).
3. See Zelnick, supra note 2, at 543.
4. Kimberly Wimlot Voss, Will Lawmakers Raise Shields to Protect Bloggers? Online Journalism Rev., Oct. 13, 2005, http://www.ojr.org/ojr/stories/051013voss/.
5. Indeed, the Electronic Frontier Foundation has recognized and attempted to quell the legal fears of journalist-"bloggers" by providing a free online legal guide for bloggers at http://www.eff.org/bloggers/ lg (last updated Nov. 18, 2005).
6. See, e.g., David L. Hudson Jr., Blogging, First Amendment Center, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/press/topic.aspx?topic=blogging (last visited Mar. 8, 2006) ("[T]hree amateur journalists at the Powerline.com blog were primarily responsible for discrediting the documents used in CBS’s rush-to-air story on President George Bush’s National Guard service.").
7. "Blog" is a shortened form of "web log" and is defined as a "website in which items are posted on a regular basis and displayed in reverse chronological order." Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). A person who posts these entries is called a "blogger." Id.
8. Jennifer Elrod, Protecting Journalists from Compelled Disclosure: A Proposal for a Federal Statute, 7 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 115, 125-26 (2003-2004).
9. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005).
10. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
11. Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, S. 1419, 109th Cong. (2005); Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, H.R. 3323, 109th Cong. (2005).
12. Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to Protect the Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 Hous. L. Rev. 1371, 1390 (2003) (quoting Mike Godwin, Who’s a Journalist?--II. Welcome the New Journalists on the Internet, 13 Media Stud. J. 38, 39 (1999) ("With a $1,000 desktop computer and a connection to the Internet, anybody can reach an audience of thousands or millions ...")).
13. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 979-80.
14. Hudson, supra note 6.
15. Id.
16. See Stephen Bates, The Reporter’s Privilege, Then and Now, Research Paper No. R-23, The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government (2000), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/presspol/Research_Publications/Papers/Research_Papers/R23.pdf (discussing generally how prosecutors and journalists view press subpoenas and recognizing obstacles to a reporter’s privilege).
17. Id. at 1.
18. Id. at 17 (describing the prosecutor and the journalist as "locked in a struggle for democratic legitimacy").
19. Jeffrey Toobin, Name That Source: Why Are the Courts Leaning on Journalists, New Yorker, Jan. 16, 2006, at 30.
20. See, e.g, id. (relating that lawyers for Steven Hatfill at one point subpoenaed thirteen news organizations in a lawsuit filed against the government for leaks in his anthrax investigation case).
21. Former New York Times general counsel James Goodale and Joseph diGenova, a federal prosecutor during the Reagan administration and an independent counsel in the early 1990s, have rejected the notion that there is an anti-media trend in the courts. Rachel Smolkin, Under Fire, Am. Journalism Rev., Feb./Mar. 2005, at 18. Goodale estimated that 500 cases litigated in the past 30 years have touched on the reporter’s privilege and that recent high profile cases have focused increased attention on the issue. Id.
22. Berger, supra note 12, at 1375.
23. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8 n.4, Miller v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005) (No. 04-1507) (citing First Amendment Center, Reporters and Confidential News Sources Survey--2004, Mar. 7, 2005, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?item=reporters_confidential_survey_ 04).
24. Brief for the States of Oklahoma et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7-8, Miller v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005) (No. 04-1507).
25. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 23, at 8 (citing American Society of Newspaper Editors Statement of Principles, Art. VI ("Pledges of confidentiality to news sources must be honored at all costs, and therefore should not be given lightly."), http://www.asne.org/index.cfm?id=888 (last updated Aug. 28, 2002) and Radio-Television News Directors Association Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct ("Journalists should keep all commitments to protect a confidential source."), http://www.rtnda.org/ethics/coe.shtml (last visited Mar. 8, 2006)).
26. Nestler, supra note 2, at 212-13. In Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), the Supreme Court recognized a privilege for psychotherapist-patient communications.
27. See generally Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, The Reporter’s Privilege Compendium, http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/index.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
28. See Douglas McCollam, Attack at the Source: Why the Plame Case is So Scary, Columbia Journalism Rev., Mar./Apr. 2005, at 29, 33, available at http://www.cjr.org/issues/2005/2/mccollam-plame.asp.
29. Fed. R. Evid. 501; see Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8-9.
30. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 23, at 21 (citing 56 F.R.D. 183, 230-61 (1972) (proposed Rules 501-513)).
31. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8-9 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)).
32. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 23, at 22 (citing a statement by Congressman Hungate, Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, upon presentation of the Conference Report to the House, that Rule 501 "permits the courts to develop a privilege for newspaperpeople on a case-by-case basis," 120 Cong. Rec. H12253-54 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974)).
33. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8-9 ("Rule [501] thus did not freeze the law governing the privileges of witnesses in federal trials at a particular point in our history ...").
34. See Berger, supra note 12, at 1390.
35. See 408 U.S. 665; see also Adam Liptak, The Hidden Federal Shield Law: On the Justice Department’s Regulations Governing Subpoenas to the Press, 199 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 227, 231 (1999) ("Branzburg is a confusing 4-1-4 decision.").
36. Nestler, supra note 2, at 224-26.
37. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707.
38. Id. at 695.
39. Id. at 704.
40. Id. at 706 ("Congress has the freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman’s privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned.").
41. Berger, supra note 12, at 1390 ("In recognizing a qualified privilege, as Justice Powell appeared to suggest, many lower courts also adopted the balancing test specifically advocated by Justice Stewart in his dissent.").
42. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710.
43. Id.
44. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 Hastings L.J. 631, 635 (1975), reprinted in 50 Hastings L. J. 705, 709 (1999), cited in Brief for the Center for Individual Freedom as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11, Miller v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005) (No. 04-1507).
45. See generally Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, supra note 27 (providing a database outlining the specifics of the law of journalist’s privilege in each state and federal circuit); see also Karl H. Schmid, Journalist’s Privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An Analysis of United State Court of Appeals’ Decisions from 1973 to 1999, 39 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1441, 1498 (2002) (concluding that courts of appeals have applied varying standards for overcoming privilege but have in general been more lenient in approving prosecutors’ subpoenas than those served by the defendants in criminal cases).
46. Compare In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding a qualified privilege based on the "plurality opinions" in Branzburg), with United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 969 (5th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging the plurality of the Branzburg opinion but rejecting the notion that Powell’s concurrence is "a mandate to construct a broad, qualified newsreporter’s privilege in criminal cases"); compare LaRouche v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding a broadly applicable reporter’s privilege based upon Justice Powell’s concurrence) with In Re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 852 (4th Cir. 1992) (arguing that Justice Powell’s concurrence only "emphasize[d] the Court’s admonishment against official harassment of the press").
47. 397 F.3d 964, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (concluding that "whatever Justice Powell specifically intended, he joined the majority" in rejecting a First Amendment reporter’s privilege not to testify before a grand jury).
48. 492 F.2d 631, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 23, at 17-18 (describing this contradiction).
49. See In re Grand Jury Proceeedings (Storer Commc’ns, Inc. v. Giovan), 810 F.2d 580, 584 ("[W]e decline to join some other circuit courts ... [that have] adopted the qualified privilege balancing process urged by the three Branzburg dissenters and rejected by the majority."). But see Southwell v. S. Poverty Law Ctr., 949 F. Supp. 1303, 1312 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (finding a qualified reporter’s privilege).
50. See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) (warning that courts recognizing a privilege over published or non-confidential information "may be skating on thin ice").
51. See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognizing a First Amendment privilege against compelled disclosure in civil but not criminal cases); Cervantes v. Times, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 992 n.9 (8th Cir. 1972) (also recognizing a privilege in civil cases but not directly addressing criminal cases); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1977) (recognizing a privilege in civil cases but not directly addressing whether protection is available in criminal cases);.In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 852 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[A]bsent evidence of government harassment or bad faith, reporters have no privilege different from that of any other citizen not to testify about knowledge relevant to a criminal prosecution."); compare Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing privilege in civil case) with Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975) (upholding privilege in criminal trial), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976), and, In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Scarce v. United States), 5 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting privilege in grand jury investigations but failing to articulate a legally principled distinction between criminal trials and grand jury investigations upon which their reading of Branzburg is founded).
52. In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2004); Gonzales v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that "journalists possess a qualified privilege not to divulge confidential sources and not to disclose unpublished information in their possession in criminal cases"). The Third Circuit found that "the interests of the press that form the foundation of the privilege are not diminished because the nature of the underlying proceeding out of which the request for the information arises is a criminal trial." Id.; accord United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1987).
53. See United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding Justice Powell’s concurring opinion to be essential); In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 8 & n.9 (2nd Cir. 1982) (concluding Justice Powell’s concurrence "cast the deciding vote" in Branzburg and thus, "his reservations are particularly important in understanding the decision"); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 715-716 (3d Cir. 1979) (employing Justice Powell’s balancing test and noting that he "cast the deciding vote in Branzburg"); Caporale, 806 F.2d at 1504 (citing In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1983) (upholding a First Amendment reporter’s privilege based on a "careful reading of the plurality and concurring opinions in Branzburg")).
54. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1998).
55. United States v. Vastola, 685 F. Supp. 917, 925 (D.N.J. 1998) (extending privilege to author of book about the mafia and President Reagan).
56. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 689 n.27 (listing all the states with statutory protection at the time of the decision).
57. See id. at 706 ("[T]here is also merit in leaving state legislatures free within First Amendment limits, to fashion their own standards [based on] the relations between law enforcement officials and press in their own areas.").
58. As of 2005, thirty-one states plus the District of Columbia have state shield laws. Ala. Code §12-21-142 (1995); Alaska Stat. §§ 09.25.300-09.25.390 (2004); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-2214, 12-2237 (2003); Ark. Code Ann. §16-85-510 (1987); Cal. Evid. Code §1070 (West 1995); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §1986.1 (West 1998); Colo. Rev. Stat. §13-90-119 (2004); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1999); D.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-4701 to -4704 (LexisNexis 2005); Fla. Stat. Ann. §90.5015 (West 1999); Ga. Code Ann. §24-9-30 (1995 & Supp. 2005); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/8-901 to -909 (West 2002); Ind. Code Ann. §34-46-4-1 (West 1999); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §421.100 (LexisNexis 1992); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 45:1451-1459 (1999); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §9-112 (LexisNexis 2002); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §767.5a (West 2000); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 595.021 to 595.025 (West 2000); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 21-1-901 to -903 (2003); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1997); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 49.275, 49.385 (LexisNexis 2002); N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A:84A-21 (West 1994); N.M. Stat. Ann. §38-6-7 (LexisNexis 1998); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §79-h (McKinney 1992); N.C. Gen. Stat §8-53.11 (2003); N.D. Cent. Code §31-01-06.2 (1996); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (LexisNexis 2000); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, §2506 (2001); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 44.510-.540 (2003); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5942 (2002); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 9-19.1-1 to -3 (1995); S.C. Code Ann. §19-11-100 (2004); Tenn. Code. Ann. §24-1-208 (2000).
59. Nestler, supra note 2, at 226 & n.123 (extensive list of state appellate court decisions recognizing the reporter’s privilege).
60. Id. at 226.
61. See Laurence B. Alexander, Words That Shield: A Textual Analysis of the Journalist’s Privilege, 18 Newspaper Res. J. 51, 60-64 (1997) (describing the wide variations in protection afforded under state shield laws).
62. See id.
63. Cal. Const. art. 1, §2(b); Cal. Evid Code §1070(a) (West 1995). See also Del. Code. Ann. tit. 10, §4320(4)(a) (1999) (extending protection only to those who have earned "their principal livelihood by, or in each of the preceding three weeks or four of the preceding eight weeks [have] spent at least twenty hours engaged in the practice of, obtaining or preparing information for dissemination ... to the general public."); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §79-h(a)(6) (McKinney 1992) (extending shield only to "professional" journalists who are "professionally affiliated for gain or livelihood" with a traditional news media organization).
64. Del. Code. Ann. tit. 10, §4320(4)(a) (1999).
65. See Berger, supra note 12, at 1393 (analyzing the variation in the focus of the reporter’s privilege protection offered under federal and state law).
66. Alaska Stat. §09.25.390(4) (2000); La. Rev. Stat. Ann §45:1451 (1999); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, §2506(7) (1993).
67. In California, the issue could be resolved on appeal in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No. 1-04-CV-032178, 2005 WL 578641 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2005). Apple has charged three bloggers with publishing confidential product information in violation of state law and seeks to compel the bloggers to divulge which of Apple’s employees turned over the information to the bloggers. Id.
68. 28 C.F.R. §50.10 (2003).
69. Id. at §50.10 (a).
70. Elrod, supra note 8, at 154-55.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 976 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
76. Id. at 975.
77. See Miller, 125 S. Ct. 2977.
78. See Nestler, supra note 2, at 234.
79. See id.
80. See Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, Hearing on S. 1419 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Oct. 19, 2005) (statement of Anne Gordon, Managing Editor of the Philadelphia Inquirer) ("Without a federal shield law, a source cannot be confident that his or her identity will be protected as Pennsylvania law contemplates. If a journalist is subpoenaed in federal court, even though the reporting was done in Pennsylvania, the journalist can be ordered to disclose a confidential source something that the Pennsylvania legislature has otherwise prohibited in our Commonwealth.").
81. Id.
82. See Nestler, supra note 2, at 239-40 (explaining that developing a working knowledge of all the relevant reporter’s privilege laws is burdensome for journalists).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 239.
85. Bates, supra note 16, at 10 ("Subpoenas are inherently, invariable, inescapably burdensome. They devour time and resources that recipients would rather devote to other matters.").
86. S.1419, 109th Cong. §§ 1-5 (2005).
87. Bates, supra note 16, at 1.
88. See Elrod, supra note 8, at 164-66.
89. Id. at 150.
90. Berger, supra note 12, at 1391-92.
91. Id. at 1392.
92. S.1419, 109th Cong. §§ 1-5 (2005).
93. H. R. 3323, 109th Cong. §§ 1-5 (2005).
94. Voss, supra note 4.
95. S.1419 at §2(a)(3)(A).
96. Id. at §5(2)(C).
97. Anne Broache, Senators: Bloggers May Not Be True Journalists, News.com, Oct. 19, 2005, http://news.com.com/Senators+Bloggers+may+not+be+true+journalists/2100-1047_3-5902539.html.
98. Cornell University Law Professor Steven Clymer spoke on a panel expressing reservations about the Free Flow of Information Act. He argued that the current wording of the bill would apply to "bloggers." Id. The inclusion of "bloggers" would be a "‘dangerously broad’ move that would undermine the idea of granting privileges at all." Id. (quoting Professor Clymer).
99. See Berger, supra note 12, at 1387-94 (comparing the application of the reporter’s privilege in state and federal courts).
100. Id. at 1391.
101. The Second Circuit did not allow the author of a manuscript on the accused murderer, Clause Von Bulow, to benefit from the privilege because the author "gathered information initially for purposes other than to disseminate information to the public." Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 146 (2d Cir. 1987). The court found that the author commissioned reports on the life styles of Von Bulow’s wife’s children with no intention of disclosing them to the public. Id. at 145.
102. See also, Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining that it makes no difference whether "[t]he intended manner of dissemination [was] by newspaper, magazine, book, public or private broadcast medium, [or] handbill because ‘[t]he press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.’" (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938))).
103. See Broache, supra note 97 (quoting the statement Senator John Cornyn of Texas prepared for a Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on the current reporter privilege legislation).
104. See Berger, supra note 12, at 1391 ("There is no need for shield law protection for writers and publishers of fiction. Such writers are unlikely to require the kinds of continuing relationships with sources that lead to obtaining and publishing truthful information.").
105. See Voss, supra note 4 ("Washington attorney Laura Handman, who handles subpoena issues for journalists, says there is no reason bloggers should be denied the same rights as traditional journalists--if their intention is to operate as journalists.").
106. See Berger, supra note 12, at 1410.