CUSTOMIZING CONCEPTION: A SURVEY OF PREIMPLANTATION
GENETIC DIAGNOSIS AND THE RESULTING SOCIAL, ETHICAL, AND LEGAL DILEMMAS
One in six American couples experience difficulties conceiving
a child. With fertility rates at an all time low, the business of treating infertility
is booming. However, due to the United States prohibition on government funding
for embryonic research, the $4 billion industry of assisted reproductive technologies
(ART) has been incompletely monitored and largely removed from oversight. Additionally,
due to the fervent abortion debate, in vitro fertilization (IVF) was
introduced in the United States without a research phase and procedures have
been forced to evolve in the private sector. Thus, the checks and balances on
medical innovation that are generally imposed by the federal government for
consumer protection are lacking. Decisions about when to go from the laboratory
to the clinic are often left solely to the discretion of private physicians.
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is just one of many such treatments
offered by these clinics. This iBrief examines how, why, and to whom the reproductive
procedure of PGD is offered. In addition, it evaluates the prospective effects
to society that arise when PGD is used for sex selection and for nontherapeutic
or enhancement purposes. Finally, it explores whether and how to regulate PGD
in the United States by investigating approaches to policy making that have
been adopted by the United Kingdom.
¶
"The great challenge to mankind
today is not only how to create, but to know when to stop creating."
¶
Lord Emmanuel Jacobvitz, former
chief rabbi of Britain.
¶
Attending to her father and witnessing
two siblings progressively deteriorate from the agonizing dementia that is characteristic
of Alzheimer's disease recently led a Chicago woman in her early thirties to
vow this dreadful fate would not be passed along to her child. The patient--who
will almost certainly develop the disease by age forty--stood a 50% chance of
having a child who would inherit the genetic anomaly. This led her to a specialist
at Chicago's Reproductive Genetics Institute, where she was introduced to the
possibility of preimplantation genetic diagnosis. Using in vitro fertilization
techniques, doctors trained in reproductive medicine were able to fertilize
thirteen of her eggs in petri dishes with the father's sperm. PGD then allowed
them to screen these embryos for the six that were free from the defect. They
implanted four of the six, which resulted in the birth of a healthy baby girl
free from the fate bestowed on her grandfather and her mother's siblings. Although
PGD has been used to screen for genetic abnormalities for over a decade, this
was the first known PGD procedure used to detect inherited early-onset Alzheimer's
disease, which resulted in a clinical pregnancy and the birth of a child free
from the disposition.
¶
Human genomic research has led
to innovations in reproductive technologies that are altering our attitudes
towards procreation, and publicized success of cases like this will ultimately
increase the demand for access to PGD. Although most agree that screening for
Alzheimer's disease is auspicious in itself, PGD does have the potential to
open the floodgates to selecting for a wider array of traits or essentially
"customizing conception." Presently, it is not practicable to use PGD as a means
of selecting physical characteristics, behavioral traits, or intelligence. However,
the genetic components of these expressions are being investigated, and it is
only a matter of time before technology will allow parents to select traits
for their children that are most desirable to them. The potential for impacting
future generations makes this a revolution that could be in danger of becoming
a more politically sensitive matter than abortion.
¶
Procreative autonomy or reproductive
choice is often the principal argument advanced to discourage governmental oversight.
Others believe that regulation would stifle debate and discourage a moral consensus,
or that legislation encompassing these new technologies may not be desirable
where it would "run contrary to basic human rights and freedoms." However, the
laissez-faire approach currently practiced in the United States--while allowing
for individual agendas of reproductive choice based on religion, culture, philosophy,
and wealth--leaves open the door to eugenic practices, and could ultimately
exacerbate the rift between the affluent and the underprivileged.
Section I. Who is likely to benefit from PGD?
¶
Catastrophic reproductive history,
genetic risk and aversions to abortions are the primary reasons specified for
undertaking PGD.1 Reproductive
histories of patients surveyed showed that the majority of patients have had
one or more pregnancies, yet very few of those couples have any healthy children.2 Approximately
25% of those couples have had at least one child affected with a serious genetic
disorder, and a greater number reported spontaneous abortions or terminations
of pregnancies after an abnormality was detected through prenatal diagnosis.3
¶
Before the advent of PGD, testing
was performed prenatally in the first trimester by using chorionic villus sampling
(a biopsy on a small sample of the placenta), ultrasound (using sound waves
to look at internal structures), or by amniocentesis (the withdrawal of amniotic
fluid from around the fetus) during the second trimester. Currently, there are
more than 500 different conditions that can be diagnosed prenatally, and this
number continues to grow significantly each year.4 These
prenatal approaches, however, leave the couple faced with a decision of whether
to undergo a "genetic abortion" as late as twenty-four weeks into the pregnancy.
Genetic or therapeutic abortions often place the mother at risk and are frequently
accompanied by a tremendous amount of guilt or grief arising out of the couple's
own genetic status.
¶
Predictive medicine, such as PGD,
while attempting to prevent the passing along of genetic susceptibilities, can
also eliminate the need to abort a fetus. IVF provides access to the egg and
embryo, making it possible to examine the DNA of individual embryos. Infertile
couples using IVF, couples at risk for a genetic disease, or those who are aware
that one parent is a carrier can take advantage of the opportunity to screen
their embryos for chromosomal abnormalities prior to implantation. Electing
to terminate an embryo after PGD shows an abnormality is often an easier decision
than abortion, and is less risky to the woman's health.
¶
Provided the parents are not hindered
by their view of the moral status of the embryo, PGD can obviate the 25% to
50% risk of passing on specific genetic abnormalities by offering couples the
opportunity to terminate in vitro derived embryos that manifest genetic abnormalities
prior to implantation. Moreover, PGD restores confidence when the embryo is
healthy, and offers diagnosis and alternatives when a severe abnormality is
present. It is, therefore, natural to see why many have elected to use this
technology to avoid the possibility of abortion after traditional prenatal diagnosis
shows that the fetus has the genetic defect. If use of PGD becomes widespread
it has the potential to reduce the occurrence of many of these genetic diseases
worldwide. Due to the fact that treatments can easily cost many millions of
dollars over the lifetime of a single individual, there appears to be a substantial
and justifiable interest in preventing the occurrences of these traits by employing
PGD for therapeutic screening of embryos.
Section II. Arguments against using PGD to select for serious diseases
Moral status of the embryo
¶
There are relatively few arguments
against using PGD to screen for serious diseases. The most often cited seems
to be related to the moral status of the embryo. The argument centers on the
effect that screening and subsequent termination of embryos has on prenatal
life. Pro-life activists argue that life begins at fertilization, not conception.
Thus, the embryos would be entitled to the same legal protections that are afforded
to individuals. Therefore, they believe that the embryos should not be deprived
of any likelihood of implantation, and that they should not be subjected to
screening that would lessen their chance of survival.5 However,
the majority of practitioners view this simply as the lesser of two evils. By
allowing for screening prior to implantation, PGD has the potential to reduce
the amount of abortions that carry greater medical and emotional consequences.
Additionally, it is argued that because embryonic cells are nondifferentiated-often
undergoing spontaneous twinning-the embryo is not clearly individual.6 Thus,
it is contended no life actually taken by the termination of these preembryos.
¶
The United Kingdom's licensing
and regulatory body for assisted reproductive technologies, the Human Fertilization
and Embryological Authority (HFEA), has taken the position that "a collection
of four or sixteen cells is so different from a full human being ... that it
might quite legitimately be treated differently."7 Consequently,
they determined that the time to be adopted for regulation of research on embryos
is at the appearance of the "primitive streak" at about day 14 or 15.8 This
"primitive streak" is the visible site of invagination formed by the interpositioning
of the mesoderm with the endoderm and the ectoderm.9 This
view has been held to be consistent with the theological view of continuous
creation as opposed to the infusion of a human soul at a particular moment.
Late-onset diseases
¶
While many genetic diseases are
progressive and disabling, a late-onset disease allows many years of good health.
However, variations in penetrance can frequently generate stress and a feeling
of uncertainty. The costs of rearing a child with a late-onset disease may be
financially and emotionally significant. Thus, the presence of a genetic disposition
for a late-onset disease may go to the heart of the couple's decision of whether
to reproduce at all. In a case where PGD reveals a predisposition for a late-onset
disease such as Alzheimer's or Huntington's disease, a couple may elect to terminate
those embryos that are affected. Some argue that patients suffering from these
diseases that will not manifest any symptoms for thirty to forty years should
not be allowed to terminate the affected embryos because they feel that by that
time a cure may have been developed. The HFEA acknowledges that while the age
of onset is one factor, the seriousness of the disorder and the circumstances
of the individual couple and family may be equally relevant. They have suggested
that age of onset, "should be one of a number of factors, but not an overriding
factor, in determining whether PGD should be offered."10
Disability discrimination claim
¶
The disability discrimination
claim maintains that prenatal or preimplantation screening for disabilities
results in discrimination against those with the disability by reducing the
numbers of people affected. Moreover, they believe that by terminating the fetus
or embryo we are sending a message that a life with the disability is not worth
living at all. It is also argued that developing remedies is hindered by the
ability to select against diseases either by PGD or abortion. Millions of people
who are currently affected with these disorders are living happy and productive
lives. These individuals argue that identifying people based on their circumstances
has the tendency of perceiving abnormalities as inconveniences. In addition,
they believe that "PGD and embryo selection against these traits will reinforce
beliefs that they are inferior."11 However,
one commentator cautions, "it would be a drastic step in favor of equality to
inflict a higher risk of having a child with a disability on a couple (who do
not want a child with a disability) to promote social equality.... To attempt
to prevent accidents which cause paraplegia is not to say that paraplegics are
less deserving of respect."12 It
is important to distinguish between disability and persons with disabilities.
Selection reduces the prevalence of the former, but is silent with respect to
the value of the latter. Consequently, we must evaluate our social institutions
and beliefs regarding the disabled, but we should not restrict the use of PGD
to screen for severe genetic disorders solely on the basis of disability rights.
Section III. Sex selection of embryos
¶
Historically, cultures have practiced
sex selection using a variety of means from timing of coitus to infanticide.
Infanticide (a form of genetic selection where infants are often suffocated
soon after birth) has often been practiced in countries such as India and China
where families place a premium on producing a baby boy. Continued lineage and
economic survival of the family are the two principal reasons advanced for undertaking
this practice. And although selective female infanticide has been outlawed in
India since 1996, the procedure is still widespread.13
¶
However, as prenatal screening
technologies such as ultrasound, genetic diagnosis by amniocentesis, and chorionic
villus sampling have become more readily available, the practice of infanticide
has declined and many couples are choosing selective abortion as the preferred
method of ensuring the sex of their children.14 In
fact, technicians in China, Taiwan, Bangladesh and India travel from village
to village with portable ultrasound devices to screen pregnant women who pay
them to discover the sex of their fetuses.15 As
a result, one study conducted in India reported that out of 8000 abortions performed,
7999 of the fetuses were females.16 Recent
developments such as prefertilization separation of X-bearing spermatozoa and
PGD followed by sex selection have the potential to eliminate theses conventional
practices of "gynecide."
¶
Prefertilization sex selection
techniques, although currently available to humans, are still experimental and
unreliable. PGD, on the other hand, has opened the doors to sex selection by
providing couples with the opportunity to screen embryos for the preferred sex
before a pregnancy is initiated. If a single piece of DNA on the Y chromosome
is identified then the sex of the embryos obtained can be determined with 85-95%
accuracy.17 Nevertheless
this still provokes ethical concerns relating to the perpetuation of gender
oppression, the appropriateness of expanding control over nonessential characteristics
of children, and unfair expenditure of limited medical resources.18
¶
In May 2001, the Ethics Committee
of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM)-a group that sets fertility
clinic standards nationwide-said it could be ethical for parents to choose their
children's sex for non-medical reasons.19 They
stated that they did not feel that it would be unethical for parents to utilize
this technology to select for a child "of the gender opposite that of an existing
child or children."20 Likewise,
they acknowledged, "it would not be unethical for parents to prefer that their
first-born or only child be of a particular gender because of the different
meaning and companionship experiences that they expect to have."21
¶
Although the committee was referring
to pre-conception sperm sorting techniques, this statement opened the floodgates
for the use of PGD for sex selection. The attitudes of some clinicians were
that if it is ethically sound to select for sex using a technique that can merely
improve the odds of gender selection, then logically it follows that it must
also be acceptable to do so using PGD, which is nearly 100% effective in determining
the sex of an embryo. As a result, CHR-one of the largest providers of fertility
treatments in the United States-announced plans to begin offering sex selection
for nonmedical referrals to patients at their New York and Chicago clinics.22 However,
other commentators did not see this as a logical extension of the endorsement
on sex selection. Jeffery Kahn, who is the Director of the Center for Bioethics
at the University of Minnesota argues, "[s]orting sperm is one thing--it's quite
another to create and test embryos before they are implanted in a woman's womb
and discard those of the "wrong" gender, at least for many professionals and
members of the public."23
¶
Accordingly, after an uproar from
members of the public and the press, the Chairman of the Ethics Committee John
A. Robertson announced an updated opinion in a letter dated September 17, 2001.24 In
summary, the position of the committee was that clinics could ethically offer
PGD solely for sex selection if there is "good reason to think that the couple
is fully informed of the risks of the procedure, and are counseled about having
unrealistic expectations about the behavior of children of the preferred gender."25 Shortly
after, however, in a letter dated February 7, 2002, the opinion was again revised
to read "the Committee reaffirms its previous conclusion that initiating IVF
and PGD solely for non-medical gender selection, e.g., for the first child,
should be discouraged. It also concludes that initiating IVF and PGD solely
to create gender variety in a family should at this time also be discouraged."26
¶
Although there is currently little
reporting on the use of PGD for sex selection in the United States, of the twenty-one
centers that submitted data to the European Society of Human Reproduction and
Embryology (ESHRE) Consortium, fifteen reported that they were against social
sexing and only four replied that they were in favor of the procedure.27 The
arguments for social sexing other than the prevention of sex linked genetic
disease include: the right to self-regulation of countries, individual rights
of procreative choice, and that the elimination of embryos of the unwanted sex
is a preferred alternative to abortion.28 Couples
in favor of sex selection maintain that the choice of offspring gender is significant
in their decision of whether or not to reproduce. If this argument were accepted
then their decision would presumptively be protected as a fundamental right
and could not be restricted without the showing of a compelling state interest.
This aspect of procreative autonomy is the focus of section V.
¶
With respect to the argument that
the termination of embryos of the unwanted sex is a lesser evil than selective
abortion, Jeffery Kahn responds, "[i]n the case of using in vitro fertilization
for sex selection, couples test embryos and discard those of the unwanted gender-a
process that seems to discount or even ignore the seriousness of the ethical
issues it raises."29 Therefore,
if the embryo is to be given any moral status whatsoever, terminating healthy
embryos because they are of the wrong sex seems to be as immoral as it is unethical.
¶
Other more attenuated arguments
in favor of PGD for sex selection include: that allowing families to select
embryos of the desired sex contributes to population control (these couples
will no longer be compelled to reproduce until they conceive a child of the
ideal gender), gender balancing within the family (they have one or more children
of one sex and would like to parent the other sex), and a desire for parental
companionship by raising a child of the same gender.30 The
Ethics Committee of the ASRM believes that although population control is a
key issue in many countries, the limited use of PGD and sex selection in the
United States cannot be currently justified solely on the basis of population
limitation.31
¶
Inherent gender discrimination
is the primary reason advanced for prohibiting sex selection of embryos. However,
this argument seems to be more compelling when applied in countries where gender
is tied to economic independence and equal rights. Presently, there is no data
that suggests that gender discrimination practiced in the Middle East and Asia
would occur if we allowed for sex selection in the United States. Further arguments
against using PGD for sex selection other than the potential for inherent gender
discrimination include: the use of medical resources for sex selection may result
in an unfair allocation of medical resources, that inappropriate control over
trivial characteristics may lead to commodification of children, and that widespread
use of sex selection may lead to an imbalance of the overall sex ratio within
society.32
¶
The decentralized health care
system in the United States makes it unlikely that couples choosing to take
advantage of PGD for sex selection will, as a result, deprive others of limited
medical resources. However, if argued in the aggregate, these individual decisions
could ultimately have some impact on the overall allocation of medical resources.
The argument against commodification of children seems to present the strongest
case against using PGD for sex selection. As the possible list of genetic tests
grow, there will be a greater temptation to select for physical traits and behavioral
characteristics. Furthermore, as more and more clinics begin to offer PGD the
relative demand for standard screening will diminish, and there is some concern
that existing clinics will begin to offer these supplementary services to remain
competitive in the marketplace.
¶
While many commentators argue
that PGD for social sexing will produce an unbalanced sex ratio, Dr. Malpani
at the Malpani Infertility Clinic in Mumbai, India, dismisses these claims by
stating that the "expense, limited availability and comparative inefficiency
of sexing by embryo biopsy" make it unlikely to significantly impact the gender
ratios of any populations.33 Moreover,
he recommends that in countries like India where cultural preferences for males
are great, that safeguards should be implemented to restrict PGD for sex selection
to only couples that already have a child.34 However,
even before PGD became available-when the one-child policy was being enforced
in India-the sex ratio was altered to 153 males for each 100 females.35
¶
In the US, sex selection is generally
sought for a third or later child of the opposite sex than those already produced
by the couple.36 One
survey reported that 34% of geneticists stated that they would perform sex selection
for families seeking to have a son, and another 28% said that they would refer
the couple to a doctor who would.37 Dr.
John Stephens's clinics in California, Washington, and New York, already offer
couples the opportunity to undergo prenatal testing for sex selection.38 Twenty-five
percent of American couples surveyed have said that they would utilize these
sex selection techniques.39 And
although Western societies attitudes towards women differ significantly from
other parts of the world, the demand for male offspring is still apparent with
81% of men and 94% of women stating that they would desire to ensure their first
child was a boy.40 This
survey tends to legitimize fears of a potential gender imbalance that the ASRM's
Ethics Committee is dismissing as a "remote consequence ... remaining too speculative
to place seriously in the balance of ethical assessments of the techniques."41
Section IV. PGD used to select for nonmedical traits
¶
Today, we may only be selecting
for gender, but as the technology catches up with our suspicions we may soon
be faced with hundreds of alternatives that could fall under the rubric of family
balancing. For example, suppose that thirteen embryos have been biopsied, six
are found to be free of the specific disorder in question and the doctor is
only willing to transfer four of them (due to the health risks with multiple
pregnancies). What are the criteria by which the remaining two are terminated?
Should we allow sex selection at this point, or what about selecting for physical
or behavioral preferences? "There's a big difference between curing infertility,
on the one hand, and trying to make sure that your child inherits your curly
hair on the other," says Princeton bioethicist and author Lee Silver.42
¶
So then, on what basis should
we ascribe impairment? Most commentators agree that pre-natal and pre-implantation
diagnosis should only be used to screen for serious disorders.43 The
"best interests of the child principle" is fundamental to legislation of assisted
reproductive technologies in Australia and the United Kingdom.44 This
principle provides that the welfare and interests of the child are paramount.
Parents are prohibited from requesting inappropriate nontherapeutic treatments
if they are contrary to the best interests of the child. On the other hand,
if two alternatives are considered to be equally viable, the parental choice
will be upheld. This approach offers protection for children who cannot help
themselves versus offering protection to those who may bear the burden of caring
for them.
¶
The English Abortion Act of 1967
provides for a lawful termination of the pregnancy if "two registered medical
practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith ... that there is a substantial
risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical symptoms
or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped."45 What
then should be considered to be severe? Can some conditions be severe in some
geographical locations and not in others based on climate and treatments offered?
Should parents abort a fetus that has a treatable disorder because of expense?
Severity is not always determined in the medical sense and can be accessed differently
among diverse family structures.46 Professor
Silver suggests three factors to determine severity: impact on quality of child's
health (survival suffering and limitations on function), age of onset, and probability
that genotype will influence phenotype.47
¶
Even if these standards are applied
through legislation, there remains a threat that more and more conditions will
be classified as severe as a result of pressure to get access to PGD.48 Perhaps
the use of PGD could be limited by allowing couples to select only against traits
that would impair one's "well-being." However, selecting against traits that
have the potential to limit an individual's well-being naturally suggests that
we must select only positive traits. A positive trait may encompass both disease
and nondisease genes; thus, the line is again blurred.
¶
When one screens multiple embryos,
however, there is an inherent pressure to select only the most desirable traits.
Consequently, PGD has a far greater eugenic potential than prenatal genetic
testing. Essentially what would be screened for is a gene that predisposes some
physical or psychological state such as intelligence, height, or even musical
talent.49 Although
selecting for physical and behavioral traits is not currently possible, the
demand seems to exist as evidenced by donor catalogs for artificial insemination
that allow couples to select for these traits by providing information on "ethnicity,
hair color and texture, eye color, height, weight, blood type, skin tone, years
of education, and occupation (or major in college)."50 The
central logic behind reform eugenics of the 1930s was that "the human race was
faced with genetic deterioration unless we actually intervened in reproductive
decisions."51 Ideas
about biological variations have been the foundation of many of the global atrocities
in the past; therefore, we should be particularly cautious of distinguishing
potential humans on the basis of behavior, personality or genetic predispositions
to genetic disease.
¶
Researchers involved in behavioral
genetics are seeking to link genes to complex patterns of behavior such as alcoholism,
bipolar disorders, intelligence, and homosexuality.52 Behavioral
genetic research can be categorized as the study of "behavioral illness" (depression,
schizophrenia, Alzheimer's, and attention-deficit disorder), "deviant characteristics"
(alcoholism, criminal behaviors, and homosexuality), cognitive characteristics
(reading disabilities and intelligence), or "basic personality dispositions"
(shyness, self-esteem, and social attitudes).53 However,
the problem with analyzing this data is that most of these traits are apparently
polygenic and also significantly influenced by nongenetic environmental factors.
Therefore, predisposition testing has a great potential for abuse because it
cannot accurately predict whether or when these behavioral characteristics will
actually express themselves.
¶
The fear of misinterpreting or
misapplying these correlations is that society may view non-genetically influenced
behavior as the product of "free will," whereas non-genetically influenced behavior
will likely be held beyond the control of the individual.54 In
fact, criminal defense attorneys seized upon one such study published in 1993,
which attempted to link the MAOA gene with abnormal aggressive behavior, as
a way by which to exculpate their clients that were serving death row sentences.55
¶
The principle of procreative autonomy
claims that couples should be free to determine when and how to have children,
and many see selection of nonmedical traits as a logical extension of this principle.
They further support this argument by stating that if people are free to choose
whether to procreate, and if these behavioral characteristics are central to
that decision, then couples should be able to select for nonmedical traits as
well. Proponents of selecting for nondisease genes often equate their argument
to selecting for disease genes by stating "it is not disease which is important
but its impact on well-being."56 This
implies that if intelligence affects one's well-being then parents should select
for it without regard to social inequality.
¶
Others suggest that if we allow
selection of embryos based on intelligence, physical, and psychological traits
then we will be contributing to inequality in society. These critics argue that
by selecting the best embryos we are circumventing the natural random process
of evolution, and that selecting for non-disease traits will lead to commodification
of children.57 They
fear that consumer-driven parents may feel as though they paid for a perfect
child and that anything less than perfect would be unacceptable. Thus, parents
might place excessive expectations on their customized children.
¶
While the current effects on society
from the use of PGD are minute, Professor Silver feels that in time affluent
parents will have children who are less prone to disease.58 Moreover,
he believes that this effect will combine with the increased chance for success
already possessed by children raised under better environments, which will eventually
lead to an even wider gap between the "haves" and the "have nots."59 In
other words, while wealthy parents are able to select traits for happiness,
creativity and physical talents, disorders such as obesity, heart disease, alcoholism
and mental illness will be left to "drift randomly among the families of the
underclass."60 Bioethicist,
George Annas, has stated,
[t]o try to give your child a genetic head start would, I think, be
irresistible for parents who could afford to pay for it .... This could be very
problematic for society. It's a road I don't think we should go down. But it's
one I could see us going down very quickly as a result of advertising, peer
pressure, and so on ... and that parents who don't "take advantage" of the new
genetics will soon be seen as bad or even neglectful parents."61
Section V. Legislation of PGD
Rights-based Arguments
¶
Arguments in favor of using PGD
are generally founded on principles of procreative autonomy. Therefore, any
public attempts to regulate this technology would likely be attacked on that
basis. The Supreme Court has examined the principle of procreative autonomy
associated with the right to privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. Although the Court has never overtly acknowledged an affirmative
right to procreate using IVF, Skinner v. Oklahoma recognized, in dicta,
that "marriage and procreation are basic civil rights of man" and declared procreation
to be "a fundamental right essential to the existence and survival of the race."62 Furthermore,
Mr. Justice Brennan stated in Eisenstadt v. Baird, "[i]f the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."63 However,
Skinner and its progeny involved only coital reproduction, and it is
uncertain whether this inferred right that stems from a right of privacy would
be applied to noncoital reproduction.
¶
Where certain fundamental rights
are involved, the Court held in Roe v. Wade "that regulations limiting
these rights may be justified only by a compelling state interest."64 The
Court specifically noted the burdens of carrying, delivering and raising a child
and concluded that a mother's interests in avoiding these burdens were significant
enough to outweigh the state's interest of protecting the embryo.65 Therefore,
it seems logical that this analysis would extend to the decision to use PGD
to select for serious medical conditions that may give rise to such burdens,
and that a standard of strict scrutiny would be applied to ensure that the state
is "pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool."66 However,
the decision may be more complex because IVF separates the embryo from the womb.
Therefore, if the embryo is viewed as a separate and physically discrete unit,
it may be held to have rights independent of the mother.67 Nevertheless,
this standard of strict scrutiny that the court applies when a state attempts
to regulate requires a showing of a "proximate and inherently dangerous degree
of harm."68 If
such a compelling state interest does exist, the Court has stated that the restrictions
that attempt to accomplish these interests must be narrowly tailored so as not
to be overly inclusive.69
¶
Supporters of prebirth selection
rest their arguments on the connection between the expected characteristics
of offspring and the decision of whether or not to reproduce.70 If
PGD is used to select what is merely a preferable trait as opposed to a trait
that vitally affects the decision of whether or not to reproduce at all, then
it may not be viewed within the ambit of procreative autonomy or as a fundamental
right. Thus, the state may regulate to further any rational interest. This rational
interest seems to exist where policy is based on the "best interests of the
child" principle. Using PGD for sex selection or for selecting for nonmedical
traits does not deal directly with the decision of whether an individual can
reproduce, but rather it deals with the product of their decision to reproduce.
Because of the Supreme Court's reluctance to recognize new rights, these types
of decisions would appear to fall outside the scope of the substantive due process
doctrines founded upon rights traditionally protected within our society.
¶
Issues of family law have been
traditionally left to the states, and most states allow the industry to regulate
itself.71 The
Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology calls itself a "governmental watchdog
for assisted reproductive technologies."72 The
society collects and validates the outcomes of clinical data and requires accreditation
of embryology laboratories. Nonetheless, membership in SART is voluntary and
many establishments do not subscribe. The American Society of Reproductive Medicine
(ASRM) also has formed an ethics committee that publishes guidelines for its
members, but again, membership is voluntary.
¶
Ten states have enacted legislation
that prohibits some forms of embryonic research; however, six of those have
specifically exempted PGD.73 The
remaining four only allow PGD when it can be shown that it causes no harm to
the embryo and is proved to be beneficial.74 Moreover,
there are no state or federal laws directly assessing the nontherapeutic use
of PGD.75 Federal
courts in Illinois, Louisiana, and Utah have considered the constitutionality
of embryological research prohibitions.76 The
Lifchez court held that "the constitutional choices that include the
right to abort a fetus within the first trimester must also include the right
to submit to a procedure designed to give information about that fetus which
can then lead to a decision to abort."77 More
specifically, in Margaret S. v. Treen, the court found that because
fundamental rights encompass the entire process surrounding abortion, the prohibition
of diagnostic testing would violate the fundamental rights of women to make
reproductive choices.78 However,
none of these decisions have ruled specifically on the use of PGD.
Federal Regulatory Framework
¶
Many believe that the inescapable
expenditures of public monies in the direction of science and technology demand
the introduction of a regulatory framework. Generally, medical procedures are
researched and introduced though the NIH. Only after efficacy is established
will procedures find their way into private practices. However, pro-life activists
in the United States have historically campaigned to enforce the ban on federal
funding to institutions conducting research on human embryos or assisted conception.79 Consequently,
these procedures are no longer carried out in governmentally-funded hospitals
or universities. Thus, a market-driven, business oriented approach towards research
and treatments for assisted reproduction has developed.
¶
In addition to privatization,
attempts at federal regulation have encountered numerous hurdles. Since antiabortion
sentiments from the Reagan-Bush era led to the abandonment of the Ethics and
Advisory Board in 1979, there have been only limited attempts at federal oversight
of reproductive technologies. Harvard law professor Elizabeth Bartholet criticizes,
"this country is the only country in our technological position that hasn't,
as a society, faced up to the various social and ethical issues involved in
this technology."80 In
1992, Congress enacted Public Law 102-493 entitled the Fertility Clinic Success
Rate and Certification Act.81 The
act called for clinics to report pregnancy rates to the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) and for the establishment of a model program for certifying embryo
laboratories.82 The
CDC has developed a set of quality standards that are targeted at assuring the
quality of embryo laboratory procedures. They include laboratory personnel qualifications,
record maintenance procedures, and criteria for the certification and inspection
of embryo laboratories.83 However,
the model program is voluntary and has yet to be adopted or implemented by any
state. Congress established the Biomedical Ethics Advisory Committee in 1988,
and the NIH formed an advisory panel in 1994 to make recommendations regarding
embryo research.84 However,
both of these bodies continued to be hindered by the divide on abortion issues.
¶
The FDA claims authority over
human cellular and tissue-based products, which include embryos, under the authority
of section 361 of the Public Health Service (PHS) Act.85 The
PHS Act provides authority to enforce regulations necessary to "prevent the
introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases between the States
or from foreign countries into the States."86 However,
the FDA's final rule provides an exception for reproductive tissues establishments
that perform only "certain limited activities that raise limited communicable
disease concerns."87 PGD
seems to fall under this exception for establishments that only "recover reproductive
cells or tissue for immediate transfer into a sexually intimate partner of the
cell or tissue donor."88
¶
With the exception of the Fertility
Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act, these agencies have been advisory
in nature. Procedurally, we must consider the establishment of a separate and
independent regulatory agency to review applications for the development and
implementation of new applications of PGD. This agency should apply the principle
of placing the burden of proof of efficacy and safety-in terms of the effects
on the children and to society-to those clinics who wish to offer new techniques
of PGD technologies. We must be particularly careful when attempting to implement
this type of technique based legislation that is targeted at a particular technology
(i.e. human cloning), because the line is often drawn to be overly conservative
and may be unconstitutional. Moreover, broad sweeping legislation is not as
adaptable to changing science and, thus, deals with innovation by halting it.
¶
Examining the governing body implemented
in the United Kingdom offers some guidance in this area. The United Kingdom's
Secretary of State for Social Services established a 16-member committee of
inquiry in July of 1982, whose primary objective was to address the problem
of relating legislation and morality to the business of assisted reproductive
technology.89 The
committee issued the Warnock Report in 1984, which called for legislation and
led to the creation of the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA)
in 1990. The HFEA is a licensing authority that authorizes and regulates clinics
that offer assisted reproductive procedures. The Authority conducts annual inspections
of clinics, grants licenses for treatment services or research, and defines
the boundaries beyond which treatment and research must not venture. The HFEA
assures public representation by requiring that half of their members come from
areas of specializations outside of medicine and research.90 These
members are recruited from outside the medical community via newspaper advertisements.91 Their
meetings are closed to the public and only skeletal minutes are published without
individual comments.92
¶
The HFEA has set forth training
and assessment criteria for laboratories and for individuals carrying out the
embryo biopsy part of the PGD procedure. They require each biopsy practitioner
to be "individually inspected and assessed according to these criteria and their
names registered centrally with the HFEA."93 The
guidelines specify methods of gaining experience and stipulate demonstrations
of proficiency in using FISH and PCR techniques. Moreover, inspectors and peer
reviewers are recruited to evaluate applications to carry out new PGD tests.94 Clinics
cannot perform any other tests or treat any individuals for new disorders without
approval.95 Additionally,
once practitioners are licensed they are required to submit to annual inspections
and to report the results of their progress.96
Section VI. Building on current regulations
¶
The United States established
the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) on October 7, 1974.97 The
goal of the RAC is to "consider the current state of knowledge and technology
regarding recombinant DNA."98 This
includes reviewing human gene transfer trials, assessing the risks of potential
transfer of genetic material to other organisms, and evaluating hypothetical
hazards and methods for monitoring and minimizing risks.99 The
composition of RAC is very similar to that of the HFEA as approximately one-third
of the fifteen members do not have scientific backgrounds.100
¶
The RAC has enacted guidelines
to apply to "all NIH-funded projects involving recombinant DNA techniques as
well as to all non-NIH funded research involving recombinant DNA techniques
conducted at or sponsored by an institution that receives NIH funds for projects
involving such techniques."101 Therefore,
a logical place to implement regulatory authority seems to exist through expanding
the committee's jurisdiction beyond that of publicly funded gene therapy to
include the review of procedures developed for reproductive purposes. In the
vein of the HFEA, the RAC would be both a rule-making and an adjudicatory authority.
Their function would be to perform accreditation of laboratories and licensing
of PGD in relation to each specific test and condition.
¶
George Annas of Boston University
believes that "a meaningful dialogue on such an important topic can't be left
solely to experts; it needs public deliberation." A solution that provides this
much-needed element of public transparency would be to establish an institutional
review board (IRB) within the RAC. An IRB could require that every new test
to be used and every new disorder to be tested for be approved in advance. The
disorders should be defined down to the level of each different mutation, and
then listed on a license under specific headings. The screening procedures should
only be approved when there can be a compelling demonstration of a definite
benefit to society and to the child. An IRB would place this burden of proof
on parents to show these tests offer an immediate therapeutic benefit to the
child and lack the potential to do significant harm to society. Immediate therapeutic
benefits exist where preventative treatments or early interventions are available,
and where these interventions would be more beneficial than they would be harmful.
Accordingly, an IRB could deny access to tests that do not offer such benefits.
Thus, IRB approval would, in effect, take the discretion away from clinicians-who
often have a financial stake in offering new procedures-and place the issue
up for evaluation by an impartial committee.
¶
Developments in equipment and
know-how will enable procedures such as IVF and PGD to be offered to a wider
array of individuals. The potential this technology has to eliminate genetic
disease and to extend life will have a substantial impact on future generations.
Policymakers should act with deliberate speed in implementing the necessary
substantive and procedural strategies that are essential to protect future parents
and their children.
© 2002 Jason Christopher Roberts
Footnotes
1. ESHRE, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis Consortium: Data Collection
III, Hum. Reprod., May 2001, at 246.
2. Id. at 246.
3. Id. at 247.
4. Lori B. Andrews, Future Perfect 23 (2001).
5. ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law, The moral status of the preimplantation
embryo, 16 Hum. Reprod. 1046-1048 (2001).
6. John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics,
76 B.U. L. Rev. 421, 449 (1996).
7. Stenger, R., The Law and Assisted Reproduction in the United Kingdom
and United States, 9 J.L. & Health 135, 141 (1995).
8. Id. at 144.
9. Id. at 147.
10. Julian Savulescu, Procreative Beneficence, 15 No. 5/6 Bioethics
423 (2001).
11. Lee Silver, Remaking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World 221
(1997).
12. Savulescu, supra note 10, at 423.
13. A. Malpani, Preimplantation Sex Selection for Family Balancing in India,
17 Hum. Reprod. 11, 12 (2001).
14. Ethics Committee of the American Society of Reproductive Medicine, Sex
Selection and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 72-4 Fertility & Sterility
595 (1999).
15. Lori B. Andrews, The Clone Age 143 (1999).
16. Id.
17. Reproductive Specialty Medical Center, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis,
at http://www.drary.com/pgd.htm.
18. Ethics Committee of the American Society of Reproductive Medicine, supra
note 14, at 595.
19. Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine,
Preconception gender selection for nonmedical reasons, 75 Fertility & Sterility
5 (2001).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. The Center for Human Reproduction, New York City and Chicago-Based Infertility
Center Announces New Gender Selection Program, at http://www.centerforhumanreprod.com/about_pressRelations.jsp?EventId=6&action=pr.
23. Jeffery P. Kahn, The Questionable Future of Unregulated Reproduction,
at http://www.cnn.com/2002/HEALTH/02/18/ethics.matters/index.html.
24. Jeffery P. Kahn, High-Tech Sex Selection, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH/10/01/ethics.matters/index.html.
25. Id.
26. The Center for Human Reproduction, Fertility Center Follows Most Recent
Ethics Opinion on the Use of IVF/PGD for Gender Selection, at http://www.centerforhumanreprod.com/about_pressRelations.jsp?EventId=10&action=pr.
27. ESHRE, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis Consortium: data collection
III, Hum. Reprod., May 2001 at 246.
28. American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra note 18.
29. Kahn, supra note 23.
30. American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra note 18, at 596.
31. Id. at 597.
32. Id. at 596.
33. Malpani, supra note 13, at 12.
34. Id.
35. Andrews, supra note 15, at 142.
36. Adele E. Clarke, Disciplining Reproduction: Modernity, American Life Sciences,
and the Problems of Sex 250 (1998).
37. Andrews, supra note 15, at 143.
38. Id. at 142.
39. Id. at 143.
40. Id.
41. American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra note 18, at 597.
42. Silver, supra note 11, at 75.
43. John Harris & Soren Holm, The Future of Human Reproduction: Ethics, Choice,
and Regulation 182 (1998).
44. Savulescu, supra note 10, at 429.
45. Abortion Act of 1967 § (1)(1)(d) (Eng.).
46. Harris & Holm, supra note 43, at 184.
47. Silver, supra note 11, at 57.
48. Harris & Holm, supra note 43, at 184.
49. Savulescu, supra note 10, at 415.
50. Furrow, et al, Bioethics: Health Care Law and Ethics 102 (1997).
51. Bryan Appleyard, Brave New Worlds: Staying Human in the Genetic Future
48 (1998).
52. Savulescu, supra note 10, at 416.
53. Patrik Florencio, Genetics, Parenting, and Children's Rights in the
Twenty-First Century, 45 McGill L.J. 532 (2000).
54. Id. at 537.
55. Id. at 529.
56. Savulescu, supra note 10, at 423.
57. Id.
58. Silver, supra note 11, at 225.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. George Annas, Turning Point for the Human Species: Trial Lawyers Should
Prepare for the Brave New World of Genetic Research and Human Cloning, Trial
29 (2001).
62. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
63. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
64. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
65. Id.
66. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
67. Harris & Holm, supra note 43, at 111.
68. Rachel Remaley, The Original Sexist Sin: Regulating Preconception Sex
Technology, 10 Health Matrix 283 (2000).
69. Owen D. Jones, Sex Selection: Regulating Technology Enabling the Predetermination
of a Child's Gender, 6 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 3-7 (1992).
70. John A. Robertson, Preconception gender selection, Am. J. Bioethics
8211 (2001).
71. Robert Lee, & Derek Morgan, Blackstone's Guide to the Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act 1990 287 (1991).
72. Phil McNamme, What does SART do anyway?, at http://www.sart.org/.
73. June Coleman, Playing God or Playing Scientist: A Constitutional Analysis
of State Laws Banning Embryological Procedures, 27 Pac. L.J. 1331, 1354
(1996).
74. Id.
75. Remaley, supra note 58, at 282.
76. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp 1361, 1376 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Margaret
S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636, 673 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Margaret
S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d.
1493, 1506 (10th Cir. 1995).
77. Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1377.
78. Margaret S., 597 F. Supp. at 673.
79. Lee & Morgan, supra note 71, at 287.
80. Andrews, supra note 15, at 221.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(1)-(4) (1991).
82. Id.
83. CDC, Implementation of the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification
Act of 1992: A Model Program for the Certification of Embryo Laboratories,
at http://www.phppo.cdc.gov/dls/art/fcsrca_9907.asp.
84. George Annas, Human Cloning: A Choice or an Echo?, 23 Dayton L.
Rev. 247, 266 (1999).
85. Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2001).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 361.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Stenger, supra note 7, at 140.
90. Brendan Koerner, Embryo Police, Wired, Feb. 2002, at 53.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. HFEA, HFEA Annual Report 2000, at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/Downloads/Annual_Report/AnnualReport2000.pdf.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee, About Recombinant DNA and Gene Therapy,
at http://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/rac/aboutrdagt.htm.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Amy P. Patterson, M.D., NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant
DNA Molecules, at http://grants1.nih.gov/grants/policy/recombinentdnaguidelines.htm.