ENHANCED 911 TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY CONCERNS:
HOW HAS THE BALANCE CHANGED SINCE SEPTEMBER 11?
E911 technology allows for the location of a
cellular phone to be determined by the wireless service provider
within several hundred feet. As a consequence, privacy groups
have been extremely resistant to the implementation of E911.
In the wake of the September 11 tragedies, however, the balance
between privacy concerns and national security seems to have
changed for many American citizens. This iBrief will explore
the nature of the E911 technology, the FCC implementation
requirements, the concerns of privacy groups regarding its
implementation, and how the environment surrounding E911 has
changed since September 11.
Introduction
¶
With over 120
million subscribers in the United States, cellular telephones
have rapidly become a fixture in our everyday lives.1 Cellular
phones have also become invaluable in emergency situations;
half of all incoming 911 calls are now made from mobile telephones.2 To
enhance the response capabilities of emergency personnel to
911 calls made from cellular telephones, the Federal Communications
Commission passed regulations in 1997 that would have required
the cellular telephone industry to complete the implementation
of Enhanced 911 (E911) technology by October 1, 2001.3 E911
technology allows for the location of a cellular phone to
be determined by the wireless service provider within several
hundred feet. As a consequence, privacy groups have been extremely
resistant to the implementation of E911 for fear that cellular
phones might be turned into tracking devices for the benefit
of both the government and private businesses. In the wake
of the September 11 tragedies, however, the balance between
privacy concerns and national security seems to have changed
for many American citizens.
¶
This iBrief
will explore the nature of the E911 technology, the FCC implementation
requirements and the concerns of privacy groups regarding
its implementation. Finally, the iBrief will examine whether
the changed climate of the country since September 11 has
had an impact on the position of the privacy groups and the
legislative measures being developed to address E911 privacy
issues.
Background
What is E911 Technology?
¶
Enhanced 911
service, also known as E911, permits emergency response personnel
to pinpoint the location of a cellular telephone caller anywhere
in the United States.4 While
911 operators are currently able to determine the location
of a caller through the use of telephone records when a call
is placed from a traditional landline telephone,5 it
is clearly more challenging to pinpoint the location of a
cellular phone.
¶
There are two
different ways that the location of a cellular phone may be
determined. The position may be tracked through the handset
itself by using a built-in global positioning system (GPS).6 Alternatively,
the wireless service provider may locate a cellular telephone
through triangulation data collected by the network of cellular
receiving towers.7 While
local telephone companies have been able to provide landline
telephone listing information to 911 services at little additional
cost, the implementation of either of the proposed E911 technologies
would result in costs of several billion dollars throughout
the wireless service industry.8
The FCC Requirement for Implementation of
E911 Technology
¶
According to
the FCC, the implementation of E911 technology is critical
to the advancement of public safety.9 Envisioning
this technology as useful for responses to car accidents in
remote parts of the country as well as national catastrophes,
the FCC first explored the utility of E911 technology in 1996
and issued final regulations in December 1997. The goal of
these regulations is to bring wireless 911 service up to the
same level as the emergency response to a wireline 911 call,
thereby enabling emergency response personnel to address a
call with the same speed and accuracy regardless of the type
of telephone used.10
¶
The final FCC
regulations mandated that the conversion to E911 technology
be accomplished in two phases. The first phase involved implementing
the technology that would allow emergency personnel to automatically
determine the cellular phone number of the caller and the
location of the cellular tower receiving the call.11 The
wireless service providers completed this phase in June 2000.
The second phase requires cellular telephone companies to
deploy technology that would facilitate Automatic Location
Identification (ALI), either through global positioning services
or positioning determinations made through cellular telephone
networks.12 Each
wireless service provider was required to come up with its
own plan to implement the best ALI strategy given the company's
existing technology and resources.13
¶
While cellular
telephone companies implemented the first phase with little
additional cost, the second phase has proven to be quite expensive
for the cellular providers.14 The
caller's telephone number and the location of the cellular
tower receiving the call are data that the wireless service
providers already collect to facilitate billings to customers.15 However,
according to the wireless service providers, Automatic Location
Identification lacks consistent standards and available equipment,
thereby resulting in astronomical implementation costs.16 Phase
2 of the E911 implementation was scheduled to be completed
by October 1, 2001, but shortly before the deadline, all of
the major wireless service providers filed for extensions.
The FCC has agreed to extend the implementation deadline to
November 30, 2001, but will likely assess fines and other
penalties if the wireless companies delay much past that date.
Privacy Concerns and E911
Consumer Privacy Issues
¶
Since it is
clear from the FCC regulations that E911 technology will be
implemented, privacy groups have focused their concerns on
the ways in which this technology will be implemented and
have lobbied government agencies and technology manufacturers
alike. In developing E911 technology, cellular technology
manufacturers have demonstrated some sensitivity to privacy
concerns. Users of telephones that are GPS-enabled may turn
off the positioning capabilities at the press of a button.
Similarly, cellular networks may restrict the use of the triangulation
location method to situations where the caller has dialed
911; only in an emergency would the position of the cellular
telephone be tracked. Through these technological advances,
the cellular telephone networks and manufacturers have attempted
to eradicate privacy concerns over E911.17
¶
Despite the
assurances of these cellular technology networks and manufacturers,
privacy advocates remain concerned that the system originally
conceived and designed to allow rescue workers to respond
to emergencies will be pressed into other uses. Chief among
these concerns is the perception that, with no clear privacy
policies in place, retailers and specialty advertising and
marketing companies are gearing up to take advantage of location
information as soon as it is available from wireless carriers.18 Other
observers' worry that E911 will develop into an indiscriminate
governmental surveillance system that would give Orwell nightmares.19 Both
of these fears appear to have some basis in reality, but it
remains unclear whether the architecture of the E911 systems
will make either Big Brother or Big Ad a reality.
¶
While none of
the major privacy advocates have come out in opposition to
the commercial use of E911 location information altogether,
most do have a problem with the way in which that information
may potentially be used by advertisers and retailers. The
primary issue here is control: will the user of the wireless
service have ultimate control over whether and how his or
her location information will be used, tracked and recorded?20
¶
One key issue
is whether a particular consumer's location information will
be tracked in the first place.21 The
major concern for both advertisers and privacy groups is whether
cellular telephone subscribers have the ability to opt-in
or opt-out of participation in the location tracking system.
With an opt-in choice, favored by privacy advocates, consumers
would have to affirmatively choose to have their location
information divulged to advertisers, which should theoretically
mean that only consumers who actually want such information
revealed will be part of the advertising pool. An opt-out
option, obviously favored by advertisers, would make the consumer's
location information available by default. Consumers would
then have to contact their wireless carrier proactively if
they were to decide that they no longer wished to share their
information. Advertisers generally favor this alternative,
knowing that relatively few consumers will take the time and
effort to change their default status.
¶
In addition
to the basic question of whether consumers will have their
location tracking shared with commercial services, concerns
regarding anonymity and long-term information tracking and
storage remain. For advertisers, functional anonymity may
not turn out to be a deal breaker; for example, Burger King
may like to know your real name when they send you the 10%
off coupon as you drive past their store, but it will probably
be sufficient for their purposes to know that you are inclined
to eat at a variety of fast food restaurants when you are
on the road and you are near one of theirs. So long as the
wireless service provider or its advertising tracking service
is able to generate a sufficient profile based on past preferences
and location history, most advertisers will not need to know
who that profile describes specifically.
¶
Once a fully
developed wireless location system matures, it seems likely
that at least some consumer location information will be stored
after the fact. The place where this information is stored
also has the potential to seriously impact users' expectations
of privacy. If location information were tracked within an
individual's handset, for instance, then that information
would be available to anyone who might subsequently find or
steal the handset. If the information were stored on a long-term
basis by the wireless carrier, then a hacker who manages to
infiltrate their network security would have access to the
records of tens of thousands of location histories. Furthermore,
unethical wireless carriers might choose to use or sell this
information at a later time, even if it means that they would
be violating their privacy policy. As experience with Internet
privacy policies in the last few years has shown, companies
may not always respect the bargain that they make with their
customers when economic conditions necessitate change.22 The
Federal Trade Commission has made it clear that companies
that renege on their privacy policies do so at their peril
and that further regulation and litigation in this area are
forthcoming.
¶
In an effort
to head off government regulation, several industry groups
have been pushing for a self-regulatory structure "with teeth"
that would protect consumers and ensure the widest possible
latitude for advertisers to use location information.23 Groups
working to develop such a preemptive regulatory framework
include the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association
and the Wireless Advertising Association. Both expressed their
support for this self-regulatory proposal at a workshop held
by the Federal Trade Commission on E911 issues in December
2000. While these initiatives are still in the embryonic stage,
they illustrate that consumers and privacy advocates are not
the only ones interested in addressing privacy issues. Many
advertisers believe that they will be allowed greater latitude
by the FTC and other governmental agencies if they self-police.
¶
Unlike many
governmental responses to new technology, the FTC, the agency
most likely to be responsible for protecting consumer privacy
once E911 is fully operational, has taken an active role in
shaping and responding to the debate on wireless privacy.
At last December's FTC Workshop, companies such as Nextel,
Expedia and 24/7 Media all highlighted their sensitivity to
issues such as consumer choice and privacy.24 These
actors seemed to realize that increasing consumer awareness
of privacy issues might complicate their future plans if they
do not address these problems early on.
¶
There has also
been a significant congressional response to the concerns
over consumer privacy and wireless location technology. Representative
Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-NJ) introduced a bill in January 2001,
which would revise the Communications Act of 1934 to require
informed customer consent to the provision of wireless call
location information.25 Similarly,
Senator John Edwards (D-NC) proposed a new bill in July 2001,
which would require consumer consent to the tracking of location
information.26 While
these bills demonstrate that certain members of Congress are
listening to the concerns of privacy groups, it is unlikely
that much emphasis will be placed on these measures given
that Congress is presently focused on passing legislation
to facilitate government surveillance.27
E911 Location Information and Law Enforcement
Agencies
¶
Although consumer
interests may be adequately protected by a combination of
congressional legislation, industry self-regulation and the
FTC's active role, protections against unwanted intrusions
by law enforcement and intelligence agencies may not have
as many proponents, particularly in light of recent terrorist
attacks in the U.S. While the contents of cellular telephone
conversations remain protected under the standard set down
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Katz v. United States,28 at
least one observer has noted that the use of cellular telephone
location information by law enforcement would be more analogous
to the use of pen registers or electronic tracking beepers,
both of which have a lower evidentiary threshold than a true
wiretap.29
¶
Pen registers
are devices that record the numbers dialed on a telephone
line, allowing police to create a log of all outgoing calls
from a suspect's phone. The use of such devices was upheld
in Smith v. Maryland,30 where
the Supreme Court held that a telephone user did not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy, one of the requirements
of Katz, when he knew that the numeric information
contained in the act of dialing would be sent to the telephone
company.
¶
Electronic tracking
beepers are surveillance devices that are planted on a suspect
which send out a signal detectable by police electronic equipment.
In United States v. Knotts, the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the use of such tracking devices as constitutional,
since they essentially only simplified a function that could
be performed by more traditional surveillance methods, namely,
following a suspect around.31 When
police use tracking devices to obtain information that would
be unavailable by mere observation, however, the answer appears
to be different. In United States v. Karo, an electronic
tracking device that gave police information as to whether
a container of material used to manufacture drugs was contained
in a private residence was held to violate the Fourth Amendment.32 The
Court held that, since the information could not have obtained
by the police using visual surveillance techniques, it crossed
the line and constituted an impermissible search. In the E911
context, since police would be able to use phone company records
of past movements by a suspect which would be unavailable
using visual surveillance techniques, it seems likely that
the leniency given to the police in Knotts would not
fully apply to cellular telephone location information.33
¶
It has been
suggested that part of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act, specifically 28 U.S.C. 2703, may provide
some statutory protections against police use of cellular
telephone location information.34 Section
2703 provides protection for the electronic records of a telephone
customer against seizure without a warrant. The Department
of Justice released a memorandum opinion on the subject in
1996,35 which
states that electronic records concerning customer location
information compiled by telephone companies should be subject
to the same warrant requirements as other phone company records,
meaning that police must show specific and articulable facts
establishing reasonable grounds to believe that the information
obtained is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.
36 The
Department of Justice, however, stopped short of saying that
this code section would apply to the use of location information
outside the context of a 911 emergency call. In such situations,
the legal standard required before the police could make use
of cellular telephone location information remains murky.
Given the general constitutional abhorrence of unfettered
police power, it seems likely that the courts will impose
a warrant requirement on use of location information; it remains
to be seen, however, what standard will be used in granting
such warrants.
Changes since September 11
¶
In the immediate
aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon,
the privacy groups that had earlier expressed concern over
the implementation of the E911 standard found that they faced
two new factors in favor of the system. First, in the few
days immediately following the attacks, some commentators
believed that a fully functional E911 system would have aided
rescue efforts. Second, as the U.S. commitment to the war
against terrorism deepens, the need to track terrorists operating
within the United States may lead intelligence and law enforcement
officials to seek a greater degree of access to E911 tracking
information than they would have needed before the attacks.
Though neither of these new factors is unassailable, nor do
they totally outweigh the important privacy considerations
that have characterized the earlier debate, they do mean that
privacy advocates will be forced to consider carefully any
further objections to a system that seems to be in the national
interest.
¶
When the World
Trade Center towers collapsed, burying thousands of people
in the rubble, emergency workers began a feverish search for
survivors. During the first few hours after the collapse,
cellular telephone calls were received from numerous survivors
trapped in the debris, with at least one rescue being attributed
to a cellular telephone call.37 While
such anecdotes illustrate the need for E911 service, they
also suggest that the urgency behind this need will continue
to grow along with fears about further major terrorist activities.
And any increase in the pace of deployment of the system is
likely to lead to a sacrifice of privacy concerns in the interests
of speed.
¶
The value of
an effective location tracking system during the current national
crisis is also likely to cause privacy advocates great difficulty
as they seek to slow the nation's plunge into the world of
enhanced wireless location sensing. While in an ideal world,
privacy groups would like location information to remain anonymous,
law enforcement and intelligence officials are unlikely to
share this view. Given the speed with which events are now
unfolding both at home and abroad, a well reasoned, carefully
considered approach to protecting privacy in the E911 system
is likely to be an unfortunate casualty. The recent deployment
of sophisticated electronic monitoring systems such as Carnivore
and Echelon,38 along
with Congress' recent expansion of the wiretapping statutes,
makes it more likely that law enforcement agencies will request
that E911 location information is always on and always identifiable.
Conclusion
¶
The current
political situation in the United States has led to a shift
in the balance of national security and privacy for many Americans.
While most citizens might have found the notion that the government
could potentially track the location of a cell phone to be
frighteningly intrusive prior to September 11, many in the
present climate would favor the implementation of such a system
irrespective of its toll on privacy. This is a precarious
time to be introducing E911 technology, for it is unlikely
that Americans will always be so willing to give up privacy
rights in favor of tighter security. Hopefully, it will not
be necessary to wait for the pendulum to swing in the other
direction before privacy measures are integrated with the
use of E911 technology.
¶
The legislative
measures still pending in Congress illustrate that the privacy
groups' legitimate concerns over the protection of consumer
privacy have not gone unnoticed. It is the responsibility
of the sponsors of these bills to ensure that consumer privacy
does not fall victim to the current focus on national security
during this difficult time. If Congress is slow to implement
these measures, it will be up to the wireless service providers
to use technological solutions proposed by the cellular technology
manufacturers to give cellular telephone subscribers more
control over the use of their information. The most difficult
balancing of privacy and national security concerns will be
in the realm of government surveillance, where it still remains
to be determined whether E911 data is subject to the same
warrant requirements as other telephone record information.
Above all, legislators and courts alike must remember that
privacy should not and will not always take a back seat to
national security; consequently, the balance, which is established
during the implementation of the E911 infrastructure, will
be critical to the technology's success in the years to come.
By:
Aaron Futch
Christine Soares
Footnotes
1. Elizabeth Douglass, Cell Phones Set to Track Call Locales,
at http://www.latimes.com/technology/la-
000082963oct18.story?coll=la%2Dheadlines%2Dtechnology
(last visited October 18, 2001)
2. Id.
3. See Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Note, Lost? The
Government Knows Where You are: Cellular Telephone Call Location
Technology and the Expectation of Privacy, 10 Stan. L.
& Pol'y Rev 103, 105 (1998).
4. Elisa Batista, No Last-Minute Rush for E911, at
http://www.wired.com/news/wireless/0,1382,47220,00.html
(last visited Oct. 5, 2001)
5. Werdegar, supra note 2, at 105.
6. Id.
7. Federal Communications Commission, FCC Wireless 911
Requirements, at http://www.fcc.gov/e911/factsheet_requirements_012001.txt
(last visited Oct. 22, 2001).
8. Werdegar, supra note 2, at 105
9. Kurt Wimmer, Privacy and Mobile Telecommunications,
19-SUM Comm. Law. 20, 22 (2001).
10. Federal Communications Commission, FCC Wireless 911
Requirements, at http://www.fcc.gov/e911/factsheet_requirements_012001.txt
(last visited Oct. 22, 2001)
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Federal Communications Commission, Fact Sheet: E911
Phase II Decisions, at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/News_Releases/
2001/nwl0127a.txt(last visited Oct. 22, 2001).
14. Werdegar, supra note 2, at 105.
15. Werdegar, supra note 2, at 105.
16. Wired News Report, FCC Grants Waivers on E911,
at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,47356,00.html
(Last visited Oct. 5, 2001)
17. See Richard Smith, E911 Privacy Protections,
at http://www.privacyfoundation.org/commentary
/tipsheet.asp?id=25&action=0
(last visited Oct. 22, 2001).
18. See Comments of Evan Hendricks, FTC Workshop:
The Mobile Wireless Web, Data Services and Beyond: Emerging
Technologies and Consumer Issues, "Location-Based Services
and Advertising: Possibilities and Privacy Concerns", December
12, 2000, at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/wireless/001212.htm
(last visited Oct. 22, 2001).
19. Testimony of Deirdre Mulligan before the House Committee
on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Property, March 26, 1998.
20. See In the Matter of Petition of the Cellular Telecommunications
Industry Association for a Rulemaking to Establish Fair Location
Information Practices, Comments of the Center for Democracy
and Technology before the Federal Communications Commission,
WT Docket No. 01-72, DA-01-696, at
http://www.cdt.org/privacy/issues/location/010406fcc.shtml
(last visited Oct 22, 2001).
21. For a complete discussion of the opt-in/opt-out issue,
see FTC Workshop, "Introduction to Privacy and Security
Issues Panel", at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/wireless/001212.htm
(last visited Oct. 22, 2001).
22. See FTC Press Release, FTC Announces Settlement
With Bankrupt Website, Toysmart.com, Regarding Alleged Privacy
Policy Violations, July 21, 2000, at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/toysmart2.htm
(last visited Oct. 22, 2001).
23. See FTC Workshop, Emerging Self Regulatory
Issues, at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/wireless/001212.htm
(last visited Oct. 22, 2001).
24. See FTC Workshop, The Mobile Wireless Web,
Data Services and Beyond: Emerging Technologies and Consumer
Issues, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/wireless/001212.htm
(last visited Oct. 22, 2001).
25. H.R. 260, 107th Cong. (2001).
26. S. 1164, 107th Cong. (2001).
27. Elizabeth Douglass, Cell Phones Set to Track Call Locales,
at http://www.latimes.com/technology/la-
000082963oct18.story?coll=la%2Dheadlines%2Dtechnology
(last visited Oct. 18, 2001)
28. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
29. See Werdegar, supra note 2, at 103.
30. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
31. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
32. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
33. See Werdegar, supra note 2, at 109.
34. See Id.
35. See Memorandum Opinion Issued By Department of Justice
Concludes that Commission's Recently Adopted Wireless Enhanced
911 Rules are Consistent with Wiretap Act, Fed. Comm.
Comm'n, CC Docket No. 94-102, Dec. 10, 1996
36. 28 U.S.C. 2703(c)(1)(B)
37. See Ben Charny, Could E911 Have Helped in Disaster?
ZDNet Asia News, 9/13/2001, at http://www.zdnetasia.com/news/
wireless/story/0,2000024746,38014490,00.htm
(last visited Oct. 22, 2001).
38. For a description of these monitoring systems, see
Internet and Data Interception Capabilities Developed by the
FBI, Statement for the Record, U.S. House of Representatives,
the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution,
07/24/2000, Laboratory Division Assistant Director Dr. Donald
M. Kerr, at http://www.cdt.org/security/carnivore/000724fbi.shtml
(last visited Oct. 22, 2001); see also ACLU Echelon Watch
at
http://www.aclu.org/echelonwatch/index.html(last visited
Oct. 22, 2001).