COPYRIGHTS IN COMPUTER-GENERATED WORKS:
WHOM, IF ANYONE, DO WE REWARD?
Computer-generated works raise grave authorship
concerns under U.S. copyright law, with arguments in favor
of allocating copyrights to the computer user, programmer,
the computer itself, or some combination therein. The author
discusses the issues and paradoxes inherent in these choices,
and assesses the nature of mathematical graphical processes
in light of the idea/expression dichotomy.
INTRODUCTION
¶
Copyright law
is continually re-modified, reevaluated and reinterpreted
to adapt to a seemingly constant change in technology. A variety
of amendments have been codified to accommodate the "Digital
Age" and the Internet,1 the
increasingly complex battle for recording, distribution and
reproduction rights in sound recordings,2 and
the relatively new area of computer programs.3 These
amendments, and perhaps the continuous judicial reinterpretation
of the Copyright Act, are up to the mark when it comes to
the newest technologies,4 in
the newest settings,5 with
one glaring exception: computer-generated works. Unmentioned
in the current statute and relatively untreated in American
jurisprudence, computer-generated works are finding themselves
susceptible to uncertain protection with future litigation
looming. Several theories exist in the current copyright system
to answer the question of whom, if anyone, can assert exclusive
rights in these works. However, it is unclear and somewhat
doubtful whether contemporary theories of protection are suitable
for computer-generated fractals and Mandelbrot Sets.
WHAT ARE FRACTALS?
¶
Benoit Mandelbrot
derived the term fractal from the Latin adjective fractus,
meaning irregular or broken. Fractals can be used to describe
intricately nested patterns within patterns, which contain
self-similarity. Self-similarity is exhibited when a geometric
figure is magnified over and over; upon each successive enlargement
the fractal always resembles the original image. Furthermore,
fractals can be recognized in a wide range of natural phenomena
and shapes, including leaves, snowflakes and the human body.6
¶
In the most
generalized terms,7 a
fractal demonstrates a limit of complex physical processes
and dynamic systems. The fundamental premise of fractals is
that basic natural processes become very complicated processes
as the number of iterations approaches infinity. Examples
of the underlying process are taking the square root or performing
the natural logarithm of a set of inputs. Additionally, fractals
are able to graphically represent models of complex processes
by iterating the underlying simple processes.
¶
Computer programmers
can create a feedback loop using methods known as recursive
algorithm and iterative functioning. After performing the
mathematical operation on the data, programmers infinitely
feed the result back into the loop; the limit of the process
is the fractal. Rounding errors in the mathematical operation
invariably lead to chaotic results in the graphical representation.
After assigning a color-scheme to the fractal results, these
errors are magnified and repeated, producing a completely
unexpected result. First viewed in 1980, a Mandelbrot Set
(a subset of fractals) completely characterizes quadratic
functions, and has been called "one of the most intricate
and beautiful objects in mathematics."8 Research
into fractal theory and fractal geometry is a relatively new
subject and has recently been used to measure the complexity
of many objects.9
¶
One interesting
wrinkle of fractals, and one that further complicates the
matter of copyright protection, is that they can have useful,
industrial applications. For example, because the human body
(which, at its core, is a simple process) can be represented
by a fractal structure, fractal theory can be useful in x-ray
analysis, tissue decomposition and preparatory surgical probing.
In addition, the art of acupuncture has close links to fractal
theory.10
WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?
¶
As copyright
law protects original works of "authorship" and grants exclusive
rights to "authors," defining the author is of fundamental
concern. There are five principle solutions to the problem
of identifying an author in the realm of computer-generated
art. A copyright in the computer-generated fractal can be
assigned to 1) the computer programmer, 2) the user of the
program, 3) both the programmer and the user, 4) the computer,
or 5) no one.
¶
While the United
States has yet to define the author for computer-generated
works, the United Kingdom has provided some guidance, albeit
with amorphous terms,
In the case of a literary, dramatic, musical or
artistic work which is computer-generated, the author shall
be taken to be the person by whom the arrangements necessary
for the creation of the work are undertaken.11
¶
While a clear
interpretation and application of this law is possible with
most works that are computer-generated, England's Act does
not provide obvious answers for computer-generated works as
applied to Mandelbrot Sets and other fractal-generations.
For example, while the Act has been tested very little in
case law,12 England's
Act would imply that a user of a word-processor or excel spreadsheet
would own exclusive rights in his or her respective essays
or worksheet compilations. A user of a word-processor would
be solely responsible for the "arrangements necessary for
the creation of the work,"13 and
thus, would ostensibly acquire copyright protection in the
resulting output. However, England's Act provides an ambiguous
answer in the case of a fractal output created by a computer
program. If the user only contributes an assignment of number
of iterations to the fractal output, then the user is not
responsible for the "arrangements necessary for the creation
of the work."14 If
this argument is accepted, then Queen Elizabeth is no better
position than the U.S. Copyright Office to answer the mysterious
question of who created the fractal output.
¶
In addition,
the industrial applications of fractals present a problem
because a useful art is not protected subject matter under
the Copyright Act. As the court in Baker v. Seldon held,
the task-oriented dimension of a useful process or idea is
not copyrightable expression.15 Precedent
has made clear that the Copyright Act does not protect utilitarian
aspects of a work.
¶
To illustrate
the dilemma, an analysis of each of the five possible answers
to the question of whom to reward will follow. While each
of the five theories have convincing arguments, this paper
will help reveal the need for a more thorough understanding
of computer-generated works as applied to fractals and Mandelbrot
Sets.
THE COMPUTER PROGRAMMER
¶
At first blush,
a computer programmer can make a strong claim to a copyright
in any output of a computer program. The creativity and originality
that the programmer contributes to the source code is the
impetus that generates the Mandelbrot Set. The programmer
contributes substantially to the output and thus should be
rewarded for his efforts that lead to the generated work of
art. In addition, the output generated from the computer program
can be viewed as a derivative work of the underlying copyrighted
program; thus guaranteeing protection of any output to the
copyright owner of the program. However, several crucial problems
arise in characterizing the output as a derivative work, leading
to a conclusion that the fractal generation should not belong
to the computer programmer.
¶
The intellectual
demand and large amount of effort required to write a computer
program are very convincing arguments in favor of granting
copyrights to the programmers. The Mandelbrot Sets would have
likely never come into existence without the originality and
creative spark of the computer programmer. Especially compared
to the user of a fractal generator program, who merely types
in the word "compose" or "compile" to create an output, the
programmer has contributed more thought, devoted more time
and expended more energy to create such a work of art. However,
there are several reasons why it is simply not feasible to
award copyright protection to the computer programmer for
direct authorship of the output.
¶
The argument
that the programmer should be rewarded for his efforts would
have been much more persuasive before 1991. However, after
the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the "sweat of the brow"
theory in Feist, hopeful creators became unable to
prove a copyright based upon "hard work."16
¶
The work made
for hire doctrine17 of
the Copyright Act provides an interesting justification for
the programmer acquiring copyright protection in the fractal
outputs. The implication of the work made for hire rule is
that an employer need not have had any direct role in the
creative process to gain a copyright in the employee's result.18 Therefore,
the rule could be used as a defense to the argument that the
computer programmer is not sufficiently involved with the
fractal output. However, the doctrine only applies when an
employee, acting within his or her scope of employment or
specifically ordered or commissioned, prepares the work.19 Thus,
it is unlikely a court would find that the work made for hire
doctrine would apply in situations where the programmer is
not in a position of an employer and the user is not considered
an employee.
¶
Frequently,
the computer-generated fractals that are randomly produced
by chaotic systems create beautiful pieces of art.20 Users
of these fractal programs can make a convincing argument that
computer programmers may not possess the requisite taste for
art that is required to produce the selected arrangements.
In other words, if the programmer cannot distinguish one piece
of art from another, he may not be the one the Copyright Office
had in mind when it granted exclusive rights in works of art.
Mandelbrot Sets are frequently created by "tinkering" with
the number of iterations or transformations performed; thus
furthering the view that the user contributes far more to
the output than the programmer. In addition, by developing
a copyrightable source code,21 the
programmer has arguably only created a potential for creation.
Just as Bill Gates does not own a copyright in works produced
by Microsoft computers, as much as he would like to, a programmer
should not own a copyright in outputs created from his or
her program.
¶
Opponents of
programmer-copyrights also argue that selling, leasing or
licensing the program to a user has already rewarded the programmer
for his work. A copyright in the output generated from the
program doubly rewards the programmer and ostensibly takes
from the user a deserved copyright. However, this is a fairly
weak policy argument because the primary purpose of the Copyright
Act is to provide incentives to create new works, rather than
to reward authors.22
¶
In addition
to the direct authorship argument in favor of the programmers,
an argument can be made that all Mandelbrot Sets are derivative
works owned by the programmer. A determination that the outputs
are derivative works of the underlying computer program would
give the computer programmer exclusive rights to create the
fractal outputs. However, numerous problems are associated
with defining the outputs as derivative works; so much so
that a derivative works argument made in favor of a programmer
will likely fail.
¶
The most convincing
argument in favor of defining the output as derivative works
is that the Mandelbrot Sets are "based upon" the underlying
computer program.23 The
Mandelbrot Sets are spawned from the computer program; without
the latter, the former would never come into existence. From
the common sense understanding of the phrase "based upon,"
it appears that the fractal output is derived from, owes its
existence to, and has stemmed from the program. However, despite
the broad language of the Copyright Act in defining a derivative
work, there is no indication in the 1976 Act that Congress
intended to expand the exclusive rights guaranteed to copyright
holders to prepare derivative works.24 Bolstering
the view that computer-generated outputs of fractal geometry
are not a derivative work is the fact that the artwork contains
no recognizable block of expression from the program.25
¶
Furthermore,
if the outputs of the computer program are considered derivative
works, a programmer would seemingly own all rights in the
derivative works, and the programmer would accordingly obtain
an exclusive right to use his copyrighted computer program.
This "right to use," however, is not an exclusive right defined
in the Copyright Act.26 Until
Congress amends the Act to include the right to use a copyrighted
work, computer programmers should not gain the benefit of
using a fractal generator and hoarding the outputs.27 Additionally,
by selling, leasing or licensing a fractal generator, the
programmer is arguably giving an implied license to use the
work; why else would the user buy the program?
¶
Additionally,
congressional intent appears to support, indeed mandate, the
view that the outputs are not derivative works. Congress refrained
from making a determination of the copyrightability of computer-generated
works in the 1976 Act. Congress created a National Commission
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) to
look into the matter. The Final Report of CONTU makes the
determination that the user of the program is the author of
the outputs of computer-generated works.28 Therefore,
to suggest that a computer programmer could own the rights
to any outputs (negating the claim by the users of the program)
would render meaningless CONTU's determination that the user
acquires a copyright and ownership in the outputs of a computer
generated work.29
THE USER
¶
Perhaps the
most appealing candidate for ownership rights in the output
is the user of the computer program. If in most situations
the user is the person most directly responsible for literally
"fixing" the work in tangible form, it is hard to ignore a
user's demand for copyright protection. The user is most deserving
of ownership of computer-generated work for several reasons.
For example, the user may attempt to create a specific Mandelbrot
Set, by trial and error, with particular color assignments
and distinctive chaotic arrays. However, there are several
features of fractal-generations that put into doubt a copyright
vesting in the user.
¶
In 1951, the
2nd circuit explained that only a modest grade of originality
is required to secure a copyright in a work of art.30 The
court in Alfred Bell ruled that striking uniqueness,
ingenuity, and novelty are not required of a copyright holder.31 The
Court's de minimis standard for originality supports the user's
claim for copyright status of a computer-generated work of
art. By "tinkering" with the iteration inputs and transformation
selections, a user can make a fairly convincing argument that
his or her actions have contributed directly to the originality
of the particular Mandelbrot Set.
¶
Several websites
allow users to create, interpret and manipulate Mandelbrot
Sets.32 These
websites allow the user to change the number of iterations,
vary the zoom level, and change the assignment of colors to
different "rates of escapes."33 Few
could argue that the user's inputs into the end product are
not substantial. Determining the values of certain color assignments
involves both originality and uniqueness, and seems to satisfy
the low level of creativity required. The user can be described
as a painter, choosing from a palette which colors to apply
to the canvas. However, as the programs on these websites
illustrate, a user could produce a work of art by clicking
on the link "Draw the Mandelbrot Set," without altering the
pre-selected variables. Neither the current case law nor the
Copyright Act persuasively supports copyright status in this
type of "unauthored" fractal output.
¶
Similar to computer
programmers, users of fractal programs argue that the work
made for hire doctrine of §201(b) guarantees copyright protection.
An even stronger argument than for programmers, a user who
has licensed, purchased or leased a computer program can be
said to be "employing" the computer.34 The
program users are employing the computer to produce creative
works of art. In essence, a user can own the rights to whatever
outputs his or her "employee" (the computer) has produced.
Even though the Final Report made by CONTU refers to the user
"as one who employs the computer,"35 this
argument would likely fail because the computer cannot be
viewed as a person acting within the scope of employment.
Lacking the traditional characteristics of an "employee" (desire
to form a union, for example), the courts likely will not
be receptive to ownership rights asserted by the user under
this rationale.
¶
The Final Report
prepared by CONTU in 1978 fully supports the view that the
user of the computer program obtains copyright protection
in the output.36 However,
the subsequent report issued by the Office of Technology in
1986 (the OTA report)37 questions
CONTU's assessment that the computer, like a camera or a typewriter,
provides the users exclusive copyrights in the resulting pictures
or papers.38 The
OTA disagrees with CONTU's determination that the computer
is an inert tool of creation and raises the possibility for
authorship in the computer.39
BOTH THE USER AND THE PROGRAMMER
¶
Under a joint
authorship analysis, the programmer may be viewed as planting
the initial seed, while the user is watering and eventually
harvesting the fractals. While this approach seems the most
reasonable from a "Can't we all get along?" viewpoint, substantial
precedent, both academic and judicial, refutes the joint authorship
argument.
¶
The first roadblock
to joint authorship is the requirement that both the user
and programmer's contributions must be copyrightable.40 Stanford
University Professor Paul Goldstein has formulated a "copyrightable
subject matter test" to judge whether a work can be jointly
owned. According to Professor Goldstein,
"A collaborative contribution will not produce a joint work,
and a contributor will not obtain a co-ownership interest, unless
the contribution represents original expression that could stand
on its own as the subject matter of copyright."41Goldstein's
view is substantiated by the use of "author" in §101, which
suggests that each collaborator's contribution must be a copyrightable
"work of authorship" within the meaning of §102(a).42 Several
courts have adopted Goldstein's test in reference to joint works
of authorship.43 However,
an application of Goldstein's test to computer-generated works
raises substantial concerns: it is doubtful that both the programmer
and the user produce independently copyrightable subject-matter.
There are a multitude of reasons that the user and the programmer,
individually, should not be guaranteed a copyright in the computer-generated
outputs. Asking for joint authorship compounds the difficulty,
as proof of independent copyrightable subject matter would be
needed. Perhaps the copyrightable fractal program would suffice
for the programmer's contribution, but then the issue of whether
the two parties collaborated on the result would be raised.
In denying joint authorship in a work of art, the Court in Picture
Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., held that there was no collaboration
whatsoever between the claimed joint authors.44 Applying
this rationale to the computer-generated Mandelbrot Sets means
that the user and programmer are not entitled to joint authorship
in the outputs because of their lack of collaboration. Once
the programmer has sold, leased or licensed his copyrighted
program to a user, his stake in the output is significantly
reduced. The benefit that the programmer has received from the
sale, lease or license would effectively end the programmer's
interest in the outputs. A large inequity would ensue if a programmer
could assert joint authorship in every fractal generation made
from the sale of three thousand computer programs to the general
public. Therefore, while the joint authorship approach would
ease the tension between the user and programmer, and provide
an equitable result, precedent and statutory authority do not
support such a solution.
THE COMPUTER
¶
Eight years
after the Final Report issued by CONTU, the Office of Technology
issued its own report.45 CONTU's
conclusion that the user of the programmer is entitled to
copyright protection in the outputs of fractal programs has
been effectively overruled by the OTA report. The primary
difference between the two reports is OTA report's description
of the computer as a non-inert tool. Once a computer, which
compiles the instructions of a particular fractal program,
can be described as something more than a mere camera or typewriter,
the stage is set for granting a copyright to the computer
itself.
¶
In comporting
with the Copyright Act's requirement of originality, an author
must be able to think about, consider and process information
so as to create a unique work of art suitable for copyright
protection.46 A
computer's ability to process information can be demonstrated
in most any application that is run on a computer; in essence,
a computer's primary purpose is to process bits of data. Admittedly,
computers are not able to evince "taste" for art. However,
this "lack of taste" should not stand in the way of a computer
gaining a copyright in a computer-generated work. Courts have
ruled that artistic merit is not a hurdle for a creator to
pass before he or she can acquire copyright protection in
a work.47 As
Justice Holmes expressed in Bleistein,
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges
of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest
and most obvious limits.48
¶
While the thought
of a computer thinking independently is a radical idea, several
theories exist for such a proposal. Perhaps the most convincing
of these arguments is best seen in Artificial Intelligence
(AI) computers. As the following excerpt from a computer-generated
work illustrates, a computer can independently produce creative
works; likely displaying the requisite originality required
by the Copyright Act,
Helene watched John and cogitated: A supper with
him? Disgusting! A supper would facilitate a dissertation
and a dissertation or tale was what John carefully wanted
to have. With what in mind? Wine, otters, beans? No! Electrons.
John simply was a quantum logician; his endless dreams were
captivating and interesting; at all events Matthew, Helene,
and Wendy were assisting him in his infuriated tries to broaden
himself. Now legions of dreams itched to punch Wendy's consciousness.
Yet John whispered, 'Just a minute! Helene's a maid, I'm a
quantum logician; can maids know galaxies and even stars or
a multitude of galactic systems? Can maids realize electrons?'49
¶
Even though
computers are capable of exhibiting creative and fanciful
works of art,50 granting
copyright protection in the latest ThinkPad is dangerous and
impractical. Computers are simply unable to perform several
tasks that a copyright holder must perform to be eligible
for protection. For example, a computer cannot have standing
to sue an alleged infringer of its work. ThinkPad 1452
v. Compaq 1342 is simply not a reality. In addition, a
computer is not capable of transferring rights to others (e.g.
renewal rights, licensing arrangements) to satisfy the needs
of a changing market. In other words, computers are not able
to evolve with a shifting market; therefore, computer-owned
copyrights debilitate and hamper a market that hinges on and
benefits from alienability of rights and interests.
¶
However, a quasi-market
failure and enforceability concerns from computer-owned copyrights
are not convincing obstacles in disallowing a computer from
owning a copyright. Copyright law is viewed with more certainty
and followed with more precision if we had arguments other
than, "We can't grant copyrights to computers because it just
doesn't seem right" and, "It wouldn't work in practice." Luckily
there are persuasive reasons why computers cannot own copyrights.
For example, even though a computer is capable of producing
creative works, the real impetus behind such works is the
computer programmer who "told" the computer how to treat certain
pieces of data. In 1983, in the hearings before the Subcommittee
on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, Harvard Law School Professor Arthur R. Miller
remarked, "Behind every robot there is a good person."51
¶
In addition,
the main purpose of granting copyright protection is to stimulate
creation and promote original works of authorship. Computers
cannot be "encouraged" to perform functions by offering exclusive
rights in the outputs. Furthermore, as the Trade-Mark Cases
explain, a work of art should not be protected if it fails
to "depend upon ... any work of the brain; it requires no
fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought."52 Therefore,
even though computers compile the information and process
the data, human authors are responsible for the circuitry
of the hardware, ingenuity of the programs and, arguably,
the imagination of the fractal outputs. Even though the Copyright
Act does not prohibit computers from owning copyrights,53 computers
do not possess the qualities required of authors to qualify
for copyright protection.
NO ONE SHOULD ACQUIRE A COPYRIGHT
¶
The last possibility
for copyright protection is that no one should be able to
own a copyright in a fractal generation. This option may be
the best, as none of the others are suitable responses to
the problem.
¶
One particularly
complicated matter arises when the user has not created the
output voluntarily or with any specific intent. This question
was discussed in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts,
Inc. The court in Alfred Bell held that unintentionally
slipping up on a painting does not preclude copyright protection.54 This
supports the view that a user need not intentionally create
a Mandelbrot Set to acquire copyright protection. However,
the court's ruling in Alfred Bell may only apply to
the specific facts of the case. In Alfred, the painter
intentionally attempted to copy specific mezzotint engravings,
but understandably miscued and did not create a "perfect"
copy. The "intentional" element in Alfred Bell is sufficiently
different from the "intentional" element in the computer-generated
work context. It is this difference in the meaning of "intentional"
that may prevent an application of Alfred Bell's ruling
in the computer environment. Not knowing what will happen
when one hits "compile" or "draw the Mandelbrot Set" harms
the user's argument for copyright protection more so than
accidentally slipping while copying a specific mezzotint engraving.
¶
Copyright protection
is never allowed for an idea or mathematical formula. Einstein
was not allowed to patent or copyright the formula, E =
mc2, because the mathematical concept is useful and, moreover,
ideas are not protected by copyright laws. As described earlier,
fractal theory is a useful concept that has many industrial
applications:
A fractal is a colored image that mathematically
models how well things survive in their environments. Life
forms survive through a process of constant change, change
that must take place within reasonable bounds if the organism
is not to be destroyed. Science uses fractals to model and
predict the survival of everything from hurricanes to intergalactic
nebulae. In fact anything whose survival is dependent upon
its surroundings can be modeled with this new math.55
¶
Defining and
explaining fractals is a complicated matter; however, at its
foundation, fractals represent nature and generally characterize
chaotic systems. As such, acquiring copyright protection in
these representations of nature seems counterintuitive. Copyright
protection should not be allowed in situations where there
are private exploitations of engineering principles or in
instances where mathematical concepts are privately owned.
¶
However, fractal
theory may represent a middle ground, somewhere between E
= mc2 and Gone with the Wind. That is, fractals are
more deserving of protection than a formula or concept, but
less deserving than a story about the Civil War. Some insight
into the matter can be found in Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarony.56 In
Burrow-Giles, the lithographic company argued that
a photograph is merely a mechanical reproduction of a natural
phenomenon, and thus could not "embody the intellectual conception
of its author, in which there is novelty, invention, [and]
originality"57 as
is required in the Copyright clause.58 While
that argument is strong, the Court ruled that the photographer
exhibited sufficient originality to gain copyright protection.
Therefore, the case implies that a Mandelbrot Set can be protected
even though it is a slice of nature and represents a natural
phenomenon.
¶
In addition,
it is questionable whether a Mandelbrot Set represent an expression
of an idea or an idea itself. A sine wave cannot be protected
by copyright because it represents a mathematical concept;
therefore, if a Mandelbrot Set can be compared to a sine wave,
then it is likely that courts will interpret fractal generations
as unprotected ideas. Conversely, if one looks to the expressive
aspects of the Mandelbrot Set, focusing on the unique array
of colors and the original and unique chaotic patterns, then
a strong case can be made that the computer outputs should
be protected by someone (or something).
¶
Moreover, if
fractal generations can only be expressed in one way, then
the merger doctrine would apply and the work would not be
protected under copyright law.59 Generally,
when encountering a functional work, which fractals arguably
are, the courts will limit protection to avoid conferring
de facto monopoly over the utilitarian aspects of the
work.60 The
courts have yet to make a distinction between idea and expression
for computer-generated Mandelbrot Set outputs. Because the
distinction is very hard to conceptualize, the courts are
ill-prepared to deal with the merger doctrine in this context.
The situation is not unsolvable, however, because chaotic
systems can always be expressed in an infinite number of ways.
Therefore, because a Mandelbrot Set has a number of different
ways of expressing the idea, the merger doctrine is not likely
to prevent copyright protection.
¶
In 1973, the
Supreme Court in Goldstein v. California interpreted
the original work of authorship requirement to include "any
physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual
or aesthetic labor."61 This
requirement raises some problems for the computer-generated
Mandelbrot Sets because, if one assumes that the output is
a depiction of a mathematical concept or theory, then the
"creative intellectual or aesthetic labor" is not present.
There is little or no creativity or aesthetic labor involved
in the statistical, arithmetical or numerical computations
found in Mandelbrot Sets.
¶
That said, to
comport with the purpose of promoting science and art, someone
should own the rights in the fractals, if for no other reason
than to bring these fractal outputs to the public. An argument
can be made that the market provides the encouragement that
the programmers need to write these programs and that the
users need to generate the outputs. The theory is that the
programmer will write these programs with the anticipation
of selling, leasing or licensing, and the user will purchase
the programs with the expectation of creating and selling
fractal outputs. However, we cannot rely on the market to
bring these fractal outputs to the fore; a grant of exclusive
rights in these computer-generated works of art needs to exist
to provide harmony between protectionism and motivation to
produce.
CONCLUSION
¶
One possibility
of protection is related to the holding in Baker v. Seldon.
Perhaps the programmer should be entitled to copyright protection
if he actually compiles the program and creates the work,
and the user should be entitled to copyright protection if
he is the one who actually compiles the work. This is similar
to the concept in Baker, where the author of the accounting
book would be entitled to a copyright if he made use of the
accounting principles, but a user would be entitled to copyright
protection if he made use of the same accounting principles.
This result, while equitable, ignores the question of whether
the computer-generated fractals should be protected at all.
¶
Another possibility,
which takes into account the questionable copyrightability
of fractals, is a thin scope of protection. The court in Feist
discussed the option of thin protection for compilations
and collections of facts. This rationale can be applied to
Mandelbrot Sets; however, the exact degree of protection is
somewhat uncertain. For example, when the scope of protection
is limited for compilations to the copyrightable components
of the expression, courts are then required to perform a fact-specific
analysis with no general rules. The same problem will exist
for Mandelbrot Sets because defining the copyrightable expression
in a fractal generation is uncertain and the Copyright Act
provides very little guidance. Distinguishing one database
from another to define the copyrightable expression for infringement
purposes is much easier than is distinguishing artistic fractal
generations from one another.
Even though the copyright system has proven malleable enough
to absorb each new medium of expression (for example, the Internet
and satellite broadcasts), apprehensions about the regime's
boundaries surface whenever a new information format emerges.62 The
emergence of computer-generated fractals is not an insurmountable
obstacle for the Copyright Act. The Act has had an "extraordinarily
successful history of assimilating new technologies" and there
is no reason why the Act will be unable to incorporate Mandelbrot
Sets.63
¶
Times have changed
since Arthur Miller remarked,
It is premature to consider the status of a work
of expression that is truly the product of a computer's 'mind.'
Indeed, it is questionable whether that type of creation will
materialize within any time frame worth considering. Today's
'computer-generated' works still have identifiable human authors,
and that will be true for the foreseeable future. Therefore,
the human element in the creation of these works is sufficient
to sustain their copyrightability and resolve any question
of authorship ... obviously there [is] no need to confront
the [question of who shall we reward], because a human author
always would be using the computer and program to do his bidding.64
¶
The issues are
now much more complicated for computer-generated fractals
than Arthur Miller recently stated. With the emergence of
Mandelbrot Sets, the question has now been presented to the
U.S. Copyright Office: who is doing the bidding?
By: Darin Glasser
Footnotes
1. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).
2. See, e.g., §§112, 114.
3. See, e.g., §117.
4. For example, §§ 1201-1205 deal with the protection of a digital fence, and the United States District Court - SDNY has dealt with the protection of DVD encryption in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes.
5. For example, while the Internet raises several issues
that have not yet been answered, several cases have examined
these complex issues, such as Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom
On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., and RealNetworks v. Streambox.
6. See http://www.mboss.f9.co.uk/ffusion/open.html.
7. For the materials on Fractals, please refer to Fisher,
Yuval, Fractal Image Compression: Theory and Application,
Springer-Verlag, New York, 1995, and Hartmut Jurgens et al,
Chaos and Fractals: New Frontiers of Science, Springer-Verlag,
New York, 1992.
8. See http://forum.swarthmore.edu/~sarah/mandelbrot.all.html.
9. For example, the coastline of Great Britain was recently
measured by using fractal image compression and measurement.
10. See http://users.med.auth.gr/~karanik/english/icmabs/p68.html("Strong
manipulations with needle in a shu point in some acute disturbance
are explained with the decreasing of the action on the basis
of the second law of Fractal theory").
11. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, §§
9(3), 178 (United Kingdom).
12. See http://www.jisc.ac.uk/pub/copyright/charles2.html.
13. supra note 11.
14. Id.
15. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). The argument that the programmer
should be rewarded for his efforts would have been much more
persuasive before 1991. However, after the Supreme Court explicitly
rejected the "sweat of the brow" theory in Feist, hopeful
creators became unable to prove a copyright based upon "hard
work."
16. See Feist v. Rural Telephone Service Co.
17. See §201(b). The work made for hire rule gives
a direct copyright interest to employers for all works prepared
by their employees.
18. Id.
19. See §101 (definition of "work made for hire").
20. See http://forum.swarthmore.edu/~sarah/mandelbrot.all.html.
21. See, e.g., Computer Associates International, Inc.
v. Altai, Inc.
22. See Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 (Copyright
Clause): "to promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts..."
23. See §101 (definition of "derivative work").
24. See Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership
Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
1197 at 1213 (1986).
25. See M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §3.06 at 3-22.3
(1985), and Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F2.d 1289 (9th
Cir. 1985); and Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352
(9th Cir. 1984);(To constitute a violation of §106(2),
the infringing work must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted
work in some form).
26. §106 (definition of exclusive rights granted to copyright
owner).
27. See supra note 24 at 1219.
28. Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works, July 31, 1978, Library of Congress/Washington
1979, page 44.
29. See supra note 24 at 1211.
30. See Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. V. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.,
191 F.2d 99 (2d. Cir. 1951).
31. See id.
32. See, e.g., http://forum.swarthmore.edu/
alejandre/applet.Mandelbrot.html and, http://www.mathstat.usouthal.edu/~lynn/
modeling/Mandelbrot.html.
33. See id.
34. See supra note 24 at 1203.
35. Supra note 28 at 45.
36. See supra note 28.
37. See Office of Technology's Assessment of Intellectual
Property Rights in the Age of Electronics and Information
(1986) (OTA Report).
38. Id. at page 72-73.
39. Id.
40. Donna v. Dodd, Mead & Co., Inc., 374 F. Supp.
429 (S.D.N.Y 1974) and Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, 13
F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994).
41. Paul Goldstein, Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice
§4.2.1.2, at 379 (1989).
42. §101's definition of "joint work": a work prepared by
two or more authors.
43. See Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521
(9th Cir. 1990), and Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Lab., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1318-19 (E.D. PA. 1985).
44. 314 F. Supp. 640 at 647 (S.D.N.Y 1970).
45. See supra note 37.
46. See supra note 24.
47. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.
48. Id.
49. Racter, Soft Ions, OMNI, Apr. 1981, at 96-97.
50. See Peter Garrison, Glued to the Set, Harv.
Mag., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 27, 28-29, and Ken Sofer, Art?
Or Not Art?, Datamation, Oct. 1981, at 118, 122-23.
51. Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer
Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything
New Since CONUT?, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 977 at 1045 (1993).
52. 100 U.S. at 94.
53. See §102.
54. See supra note 30.
55. http://www.lightlink.com/homer/what.html.
56. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
57. Id at 58-59.
58. See supra note 51 at 1061.
59. See supra note 15.
60. See Marshall Leaffer, Understanding Copyright
Law, 3rd Edition, Matthew Bender, 1999, at page 80.
61. 412 U.S. 546, 561
62. See supra note 51 at 1053-54.
63. Id.
64. Id.