THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE AND DIGITAL PHONORECORDS
This iBrief follows various phonorecord formats
to illustrate the specifics of the First Sale doctrine as
it applies to digital phonorecords. The author argues that
the disposal of a digital phonorecord by means of distribution
infringes an author's exclusive right to reproduce the underlying
musical work and this distribution is not subject to First
Sale protection.
Introduction
¶
Digital phonorecords
are a relatively new technology that allows musical works
to be played, recorded and stored in digital format for use
on computers or other devices. This technology has amazing
potential for consumers and musicians alike, but this potential
is limited by its legal consequences.
¶
The owner of
a particular copy of a traditional format phonorecord, such
as a vinyl record or cassette tape, may dispose of her phonorecords
through distribution to another person without interference
from the Copyright owner of the musical work after the Copyright
owner first makes the phonorecord available to the public.
This protection, called "First Sale," does not shield similar
disposals of digital phonorecords, however, because of the
necessary reproductions needed to perform the task in the
digital realm. These reproductions, when combined with the
ease of distribution of illegally reproduced digital phonorecords,
infringe rights not shielded by First Sale.
What is a Phonorecord?
¶
Section 101
of the 1976 Copyright Act defines a phonorecord as a
"[M]aterial object[ ] in which sounds * * * are
fixed * * * and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device."1
¶
This definition,
like any other statutory language, is terribly clunky. In
plain English, a phonorecord is what most people would refer
to as a "record." This can be a vinyl record, a Compact Disk
(CD), a tape, or any other fixed medium containing a song
- the exact medium is not important for status as a phonorecord.
¶
Although the
medium is not important for status as a phonorecord, fixation
in a material object is important. The Section 101 definition
indicates that a song embodied in a non-material form is not
a phonorecord. Thus, a tune sung in the shower is not fixed
in any material object and cannot therefore fit the definition
of a phonorecord.
The First Sale Doctrine
¶
Section 106
of the 1976 Copyright Act grants the owner of a Copyright
six exclusive rights: reproduction, preparation of derivative
works, distribution, public performance, public display, and
digital transmission performance.2 However,
a Copyright owner's right of distribution is limited by the
First Sale Doctrine, as codified in Section 109 of the Act.
Section 109(a) provides in relevant part:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of 106(3), the owner
of a particular * * * phonorecord lawfully made under this
title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled,
without the authority of the Copyright owner, to sell or otherwise
dispose of the possession of that * * * phonorecord."3
¶
The disposal
§109(a) speaks of allows two options: distribution of
a particular phonorecord to another or to destruction of a
particular phonorecord. Thus, this section allows me to sell
a vinyl copy of a phonorecord to a friend or destroy my phonorecord
without requiring permission from the author. First Sale is
not an absolute right, however. It is important to note that
First Sale covers transfers of ownership4 not
merely transfers of possession, such as rental, lease or lending5 of
phonorecords.6
¶
First Sale is
further limited in that it applies only to "a particular *
* * phonorecord lawfully made under this title." There are
actually two important limitations in this phrase: "particular"
and "lawfully made." First Sale allows you to dispose of only
the particular copy you own. Thus, First Sale does not allow
me to sell a friend's phonorecord simply because I also own
a copy.7 Additionally,
any copy that is sold must be "lawfully made." This means
that First Sale will not exonerate me if I sold a pirated
phonorecord, even though I own a lawfully obtained phonorecord
as well. First Sale will also not immunize me if I sold pirate
phonorecords I had reproduced from a lawfully obtained copy
because each and every reproduction is not the "particular"
and "lawfully obtained" copy I was sold.
¶
The final limitation
to the First Sale Doctrine that concerns our discussion relates
to the exclusive rights of a Copyright owner other than those
shielded by First Sale. First Sale allows you "to sell or
otherwise dispose of" a particular phonorecord without the
authorization of the Copyright owner, but it does not impact
any of the other exclusive rights the Copyright owner holds,
such as reproducing the work in phonorecords8 adapting
the work into other formats9 or
publicly performing the work10
Digital Phonorecords
¶
Digital phonorecords
are a new concept both to Copyright law and overall society,
but there really is no exact definition of what they are.
Fortunately, the 1976 Copyright Act was written broadly to
encompass not only 1976 technology, but also all technology
"later developed." A working definition of "digital phonorecord"
for this iBrief will be "a non-analog phonorecord fixed in
a binary or digital medium." The most obvious example of a
digital phonorecord is the now ubiquitous Mp3 file format,
made famous by the MyMp311 and
Napster cases12 but
digital phonorecords can be any number of file formats.13
¶
Because these
digital files are phonorecords, they must be "fixed" in "material
objects," like other phonorecords. Section 101 defines "fixed"
as:
"[S]ufficiently permanent or stable to permit it
to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for
a period of time of more than transitory duration."14
¶
Fixation may
seem like a hurdle considering an Mp3 file is composed of
ones and zeros, but this hurdle is quickly crossed. Unlike
a shower rendition of a song that is captured only by my ears,
a digital file is actually a series of positively- and negatively-charged
ions trapped in a magnetic source, be it a floppy diskette
or a hard disk drive. The file is thus fixed in a material
object, as it will exist for as long as the storage medium
exists (absent accidental erasure by another magnetic source).
¶
But the analysis
of fixation does not end there. Much like other phonorecords,
a digital phonorecord requires a device to allow a user to
hear the sounds embodied therein. This device is usually a
computer, but can be a digital player, such as the Rio Mp3
Player15 The
question of how the device, namely a computer16 plays
the phonorecord is important to analyze.
¶
If the digital
phonorecord is stored in magnetic media, such as a diskette,
outside of the computer, the user must insert this media into
the computer. At this point, the user has two options: copy
the digital phonorecord onto the computer's hard drive or
play the digital phonorecord from the diskette. If the digital
phonorecord is placed onto the user's hard drive (i.e. digitally
copied), a reproduction has been made.17
¶
Once the decision
concerning location is made, the user must then utilize a
program to listen to the digital phonorecord. To do this,
the device must load the phonorecord into Random Access Memory
(RAM)18 regardless
of whether the phonorecord is on the diskette or on the hard
drive. RAM is a volatile memory type, not a permanent memory
type, and thus the copy of the phonorecord that was loaded
into RAM will be destroyed when the device is turned off.
Courts have recently been forced to determine if loading a
digital file into RAM creates a "copy" under the 1976 Act
that is sufficiently fixed for infringement purposes.
¶
Some addressing
this topic claim that RAM copies are not sufficiently fixed
for infringement purposes, but the prevailing view is that
RAM copies are sufficiently fixed. The sticking point for
this debate is the phrase "for more than a transitory duration"
in the definition of fixation.19 Those
who argue that the copies are merely ephemeral and not fixed
point to the legislative history of the 1976 Act. The House
Report accompanying the Act states that:
"[T]he definition of 'fixation' would exclude from
the concept purely evanescent or transient reproductions such
as those * * * captured momentarily in the 'memory' of a computer."20
¶
The prevailing
view looks to the 1993 MAI Systems v. Peak Computer case21 for
support. In MAI, the Ninth Circuit held that loading a computer
operating system into RAM from permanent storage created a
fixed copy of the operating system, sufficient for infringement
purposes. The MAI reasoning was adopted in several other courts22 and
in the political realm by the White Paper23 Additionally,
Congress implicitly supported the legal findings of MAI when
it altered Section 117 to specifically overrule the facts
of MAI, while not overruling the legal propositions of the
case.24 In
fact, Congress specifically rejected a proposal to state that
no RAM copying is infringement (and thus directly overturn
MAI) in 1998.25
¶
The reasoning
of MAI can be extended beyond computer programs because all
digital files are loaded into RAM to be manipulated - just
as programs are. If loading into RAM creates fixed copies
for these computer programs it follows that other digital
files loaded into RAM are also sufficiently fixed. Regardless
of which side of the debate is correct policy, RAM copies
are deemed fixed for purposes of finding infringement under
Copyright law.
The Legal Significance of Digital Phonorecords
¶
The technology
used for digital phonorecords creates a large legal rift between
digital phonorecords and other phonorecords. While non-digital
phonorecords do not implicate the reproduction right during
use, digital phonorecords do. For example, when I listen to
a vinyl record, I simply put the turntable needle on the groove
and it plays. However, when I want to listen to my Mp3 version
of the song, a RAM copy is made and thus the author's exclusive
reproduction right is implicated. Under MAI, this copy is
sufficient for infringement purposes if I was the unlawful
possessor of this Mp3.26
¶
Digital phonorecords
also differ from other phonorecords because there exists unlimited
and unchecked reproduction ability in the digital realm. This
ability is distinct from the reproductions made during the
utilization of the digital phonorecord (RAM copy made for
listening) and is arguably the more problematic issue for
Copyright owners. While it is possible to make reproductions
of more traditional phonorecord formats, the process is expensive
and labor-intensive. The most difficult common-format phonorecord
to reproduce is likely the vinyl record, because reproduction
requires a machine that measures and records the physical
grooves of the master record and then cuts individual vinyl
copies after this. Analog tape is easier, but the more generational
copies you make, the lower the sound quality becomes. CD's
are much easier because massive machines exist to "burn" hundreds
of copies simultaneously, but the media used can be expensive.
In contrast, I can make hundreds of digital copies of any
digital phonorecord in seconds by simply utilizing my computer's
copy and paste functions. Each and every one of these copies
will be a costless, sonically exact copy of the original.
For Copyright owners, there is no way of knowing how many
digital reproductions are made or which files are in fact
reproductions and which are originals.
¶
A final distinction
between digital phonorecords and traditional phonorecord formats
is the ease of instant and widespread distribution of copies.
While it may be easy to hand off a copy of a pirated CD to
a friend, it is even easier to distribute hundreds of infringing
copies of a digital phonorecord via email. Additionally, the
Internet allows for instant unlimited distribution to people
all over the world, almost a mind-boggling concept.
The First Sale Doctrine Does Not Fit Digital Phonorecords
¶
As currently
written and interpreted, the First Sale doctrine does not
allow the disposal of digital phonorecords through distribution.
First Sale does not allow distribution because there is no
transfer of ownership when there is a transfer of possession.
Even if there is a transfer of ownership, though, First Sale
does not allow for the distribution of the phonorecord because
of the reproductions necessary for this distribution and the
ease of distribution of infringing copies.
¶
In the absence
of a clear indication of transfer, it is unclear if there
is a transfer of ownership under Section 109(d) when you receive
a digital phonorecord.27 I
argue this change in possession does not transfer ownership
in the digital phonorecord. Instead, there is something similar
to an implied license in which you can use and delete the
phonorecord, but not further distribute it in any manner.
Allowing a user to distribute a digital phonorecord implicates
the Copyright owner's exclusive reproduction right is and
counter to the policy underlying United States Copyright law.
¶
The First Sale
doctrine is a statutory doctrine that allows you to do two
things: destroy or distribute. For digital phonorecords, reproduction
is required for use, but you surely have an implied license
to make these reproductions when listening to a lawfully obtained
copy.28 You
also likely have an implied license to dispose of a lawfully
obtained digital phonorecord by deleting the file.29
¶
Although an
implied license to make RAM copies likely exists, an implied
license to reproduce a digital phonorecord while distributing
it likely does not. This is because of the ease in which infringing
reproductions and distributions of these reproductions occur
in the digital realm. Reproductions in RAM and email buffers
for alienation are not as bad as the ability to make hundreds
of perfect digital copies and send them to numerous friends.
If the digital phonorecord was sold to you on a magnetic media,
such as a floppy disk, a reproduction must be made to move
the file to your computer - both for use and storage. Thus,
even if the digital phonorecord were on a disk, infringing
reproductions are easily made and distributed.
¶
The necessary
reproductions made to distribute the digital phonorecords,
and the ease of creating and distributing infringing phonorecords,
are contrary to the public policy underlying Copyright law.
While Copyright law does not usually employ the balancing
tests ubiquitous in other areas of the law, this requires
a balance. Copyright balances the incentive given to authors
with those rights given to the public. The incentive is a
limited monopoly that the author may exploit, balanced against
certain limitations on what may be protected under Copyright
and for how long. For example, the protection of life plus
seventy years is undercut by the fact that only the original
expression, and not the facts or ideas therein, may be protected
for this length. And while the author has the exclusive right
to prepare derivative works from her original work, she must
also share with the public the ability to parody her work.
¶
This balancing
test is important to digital phonorecords because the interests
of the composers and producers of these phonorecords have
to be balanced against the interests of those that purchase
and use these phonorecords. While it is true that a person
should be able to sell her legally obtained copy of a phonorecord,
the composers and producers of the song must be able to recoup
their investment in their work.30 In
the digital realm, reproduction and distribution of the reproduced
copies is so easy that it seems almost counterintuitive to
pay for a legally obtained copy if your friend can email a
copy to you for free. This process can easy snowball to the
point that a single phonorecord sold is reproduced into hundreds
of perfect digital phonorecords. Although hundreds of people
enjoy the phonorecord, the composers and producers are paid
for just one phonorecord. In order to ensure incentive to
create new works, composers must be able to limit this. Thus
when the artist sells the digital phonorecords to the customer,
regarding that sale as a transfer of possession of a digital
phonorecord, rather than a transfer of title, is more conducive
to underlying Copyright policy. 31
¶
Even if the
receipt of a digital phonorecord transfers ownership, First
Sale does not allow a person to dispose of a digital phonorecord
through distribution. First Sale is of no help because the
reproduction right is always implicated in the digital realm.
¶
For example,
First Sale would not shield the transmission of a digital
phonorecord over the Internet. In both the digital realm and
the physical world it is easy to alienate a phonorecord. In
the non-digital world, I put my copy into an envelope and
mail it to a friend. In the digital realm, the process is
even easier - I simply attach an Mp3 to an email and send
this to a friend. In the non-digital world, my friend has
my copy of the record (and the same number of copies exist),
but in the digital realm there are more copies than we started
with.32 This
is because an email program reproduces the original file you
wish to attach and sends the reproduction, not the file resident
on your hard drive. This is what allows you to address a single
email to hundreds of people, attach a file, and all the people
receive the email and the file while you still retain your
copy of the file. But First Sale only allows you to dispose
of a particular phonorecord, not reproduce a phonorecord.
So even if you distributed the phonorecord to one person over
the Internet, First Sale will not shield this transfer.
¶
Another reason
First Sale will not allow the distribution of a digital phonorecord
is because any digital phonorecord distributed will be a reproduction,
[and] not the "particular copy" owned. Section 109 allows
the owner of a digital phonorecord to dispose of her "particular
copy," not any reproductions thereof. The digital realm is
one defined by an ease of copying and also necessary copying
- reproductions are made when a digital file is used as well
as when it is transmitted. A reproduction is made when a person
wishes to transmit the phonorecord, and it is the reproduction
that is transmitted, not the "particular copy" the person
owns. Additionally, a reproduction of the phonorecord is made
when a person transfers the phonorecord from one medium to
another, i.e. from a hard drive to a diskette. If the person
sells the diskette to a friend, the phonorecord contained
therein is the reproduction, not the "particular copy" the
person owns. Because First Sale cannot shield any reproductions,
it is inapplicable in this situation.
¶
A final reason
why First Sale does not allow distribution of digital phonorecords
rests in the public policy supporting the Copyright monopoly.
As stated above, Copyright balances the incentives given to
authors with those rights given to the public. Thus, the author
is given a limited monopoly as an incentive to create, but
certain limitations are placed on what may be protected and
for how long. In order for the author to continue creating,
her monopoly must be protected - i.e., protection from infringing
reproduction and distribution of her work. Because of the
ease of infringing reproductions and distributions in the
digital realm, this balance falls in favor of the Copyright
owner.
¶
It may be said
that the answer is to allow these reproductions but raise
the price of digital phonorecords. This idea would only serve
to motivate people to find an infringing copy instead of pay
an increasing amount for the legitimate phonorecord. Similarly,
the answer cannot be to reduce the cost. The cost of a single
digital phonorecords is very small33 but
even a nominal fee costs more than the free alternative. Moreover,
the lower the cost, the lower the royalties paid to the composer
and producer. This just serves to decrease the incentive to
create further works. For digital phonorecords, the answer
must be to restrict the ability of individuals to make reproductions
and distribute these reproductions.
Conclusion
¶
This iBrief
has followed various phonorecord formats to illustrate the
specifics of the First Sale doctrine as it applies to digital
phonorecords. While First Sale clearly allows an owner of
a non-digital phonorecord format of this song, such as vinyl
record and CD, to dispose of her copy through further distribution,
First Sale is inapplicable to similar distributions of digital
phonorecords because of the reproductions made during distribution
and the ease in which infringing reproductions can be further
distributed.
By: Bob Hyde
Footnotes
1. 17 U.S.C. §101 (1999).
2. The full text of Section 106 is as follows:
"Subject to sections 107 through 121, the owner of a Copyright
under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize
any of the following:
to reproduce the Copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
to prepare derivative works based upon the Copyrighted work;
to distribute copies or phonorecords of the Copyrighted work
to the public for sale or other transfer of ownership, or
by rental, lease, or lending;
in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, to perform the Copyrighted work publicly;
in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works,
including the individual images of a motion picture or audiovisual
work, to display the Copyrighted work publicly; and
in the case of sound recordings, to perform the Copyrighted
work publicly by means of digital audio transmission."
17 U.S.C. §106 (1999).
3. 17 U.S.C. §109(a) (1994).
4. 17 U.S.C. §109(d) (1994).
5. 17 U.S.C. §109(b)(1)(A) (1994). The Record Rental Amendment
(Pub.L. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (1984)) added this particular
language to Section 109 in an attempt to combat widespread
illicit copying of phonorecords caused by record rental houses.
For further discussion see H.R. Rep. No. 98-927, at 2 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.S.C.A.N. 2898, 2899.
6. It is important to note Section 202 of the 1976 Act. This
Section provides in relevant part that:
"Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights
under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material
object in which the work is embodied. Transfer of ownership
of any material object * * * does not itself convey any rights
in the copyrighted work embodied in the object[.]"
17 U.S.C. §202 (1976). Thus, when I buy a phonorecord, the
Copyright owner does not lose his rights in the underlying
work. The converse of this is that the owner of the Copyright
may still exercise his/her exclusive rights provided under
section 106, regardless of who owns the material support.
The limit to this is the right of distribution in First Sale.
However, all other rights in the work, such as reproduction
are retained by the Copyright owner and thus cannot be exercised
by the owner of the physical support.
7. This may seem like an example of common sense, but the
"particular copy" will be important to the discussion of digital
phonorecords below.
8. See Design Options, Inc. v. BellePointe, Inc., 940 F.Supp.
86, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
9. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F.Supp. 741, 745 (N.D.
Ill. 1983).
10. See Columbia Pictures v. Redd Horne, Inc. 749 F.2d 154,
160 (3rd Cir. 1984).
11. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d
349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
12. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5446
(9th Cir. 2001).
13. Some other examples of digital phonorecord formats are:
WAV, Windows Media, MIDI, Real Audio, Liquid Audio, M3U, CDA,
RMI, and AIFF. This is by no means an exclusive list of possible
digital phonorecord file formats.
14. 17 U.S.C. §101 (1999).
15. http://www.riohome.com/
(visited April 18, 2001).
16. I will focus on computers because they are by far the
most widely used medium for digital phonorecords.
17. See Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assoc., Inc., 144 F.3d
96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1998). See also Nimmer §8.08. See
generally CONTU Final Report. Section 117 specifically allows
the installation (i.e. making a reproduction of the work from
the disk and placing the reproduction of the work onto the
user's hard drive) of computer software into a computer for
purposes of use. However, section 117 does not speak to other
digital works, such as digital phonorecords.
18. The computer must load the phonorecord into RAM in order
to manipulate, i.e. play, stop, or pause, the file.
19. See eg. Jessica Litman, Copyright in the Twenty-First
Century: The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 Cardozo Arts
& Ent. L.J. 29, 41-44 (1994).
20. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666.
21. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir.
1993), cert denied 510 U.S. 1033; 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994).
22. See eg. Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., 144 F.3d
96 (D.C. App. 1998); Marobie-Fl., Inc. v. National Ass'n of
Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167, (N.D. Ill. 1997);
CSU Holdings v. Xerox (In re Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust
Litig.), 910 F. Supp. 1537, (D. Kan. 1995); Advanced Computer
Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994).
23. Intellectual Property and the National Information
Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual
Property Rights. Bruce A. Lehman and Ronald H. Brown.
Information Infrastructure Task Force, pages 64-66 (1995).
24. Section 117(c) allows an exception for reproductions
made for "machine maintenance or repair." 17 U.S.C. §117(c)
(1998).
25. Report to Congress: Study Examining 17 U.S.C. Sections
109 and 117 Pursuant to Section 104 of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications
and Information Administration, page 9 (March 2001).
26. It is true that new technological advances that prevent
skipping in CD players may create RAM buffer copies inside
the CD player. While this buffering has not been examined
by courts to determine if a legal parallel exists with computer
RAM copies, it seems unlikely that the CD player copies would
be infringing. First, the CD player RAM buffers only a few
seconds of the song. Second, and more importantly, a CD player
requiring buffering techniques would not likely be able to
reproduce the digitally buffered sounds. Unlike a computer
that is able to make duplications of RAM copies, a CD player's
RAM buffer has no other value outside of the utilization and
function of listening to the phonorecord.
27. Most sites offering lawfully obtainable digital phonorecords
do not discuss the Copyright in the phonorecord or the transfer
of ownership of the phonorecord. The exception is EMusic (http://www.emusic.com),
which discusses Copyright in terms of "Personal Rights & Responsibilities
as an MP3 User." This section of the website is more a discussion
of personal/fair use of digital phonorecords and does not
specifically address ownership.
28. Under MAI, it seems clear that the reproductions made
from a pirated copy could be a violation of the exclusive
reproduction right and an infringement. However, there is
no exclusive right to use in the Copyright Act, unlike
the protection given to patent. Ralph Brown, Jr., discussed
this topic in his article, Eligibility for Copyright Protection:
A Search for Principled Standards, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 579,
588-89 (1985). Professor Brown notes that the Copyright Act
does not confer any exclusive right to use a work, which helps
explain why the standards for obtaining a patent monopoly
are so much more stringent.
29. The reproduction right is not implicated in deletion
of the phonorecord. Thus, First Sale allows you to dispose
of your particular copy through deletion.
30. If authors are unable to recoup investment, there will
be no incentive to create new works.
31. The argument that the transfer of possession of a digital
phonorecord does not transfer title is slightly undercut by
previous holdings concerning motion picture prints. Until
the advent of home video devices, it was standard practice
in the movie industry for movie companies to rent motion picture
prints to movie theaters rather than actually transferring
title. See Nimmer §8.12, section B.1. Courts began, however,
to qualify a transfer in possession without a time limit and
without an express reservation of title as a sale. See United
States v. Atherton, 561 F.2d 747 (9 Cir. 1977); United States
v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9 Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 929 (1977), reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 977 (1977).
These movie print cases can be easily distinguished from digital
phonorecords, though, because of the medium involved. Unlike
film prints, digital phonorecords are easily reproducible
and these copies are easily distributed after reproduction.
Motion picture prints are simply not as easily reproduced
and distributed as digital files.
32. At very least, there are two copies of the phonorecord
at this point - the phonorecord I retained and the phonorecord
that my friend receives. Depending on the email system used,
though, there may be many more phonorecord copies made.
33. As of April 21, 2001, EMusic sells digital phonorecords
for $.99 per song.