Administrative Law

The Year In Review 2005

Administrative Law

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Ninth Circuit

Yakutat, Inc. v. Gutierrez

In Yakutat, Inc. v. Gutierrez,[1] the Ninth Circuit held that a regulation setting qualifying years for the purpose of awarding fishing licenses was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by a rational basis.[2] Yakutat challenged the licensing program of the National Marine Fisheries Service in district court on the grounds that exclusion of 1999 as a qualifying year was unfair, inequitable, and lacked a rational basis.[3] The district court granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment, and Yakutat appealed.[4] The Ninth Circuit held that because the Secretary based the regulation on various reports and public comments, it was not arbitrary or capricious.[5] Further, the Secretary’s decision to place a higher premium on historical participation when limiting entry of newer fishing vessels was a rational basis for the regulation.[6] The Ninth Circuit held that a National Marine Fisheries Service regulation that sets qualifying years for the purpose of awarding fishing licenses was valid because it was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by a rational basis.[7]

Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Forest Service

In Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Forest Service,[8] the Ninth Circuit held that the U.S. Forest Service’s adoption of a logging plan based on an error in market demand projection was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)[9] and misleading and inadequate in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)[10].[11] In revising the land management plan for a forest, the Forest Service misinterpreted market demand projections for timber.[12] As a result, the Forest Service included in its Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) a projection that was nearly double the true number and adopted a logging plan using these incorrect numbers.[13] The Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) challenged the plan as arbitrary and capricious and the EIS as misleading and inadequate.[14] The district court held for the Forest Service, concluding that the error was insignificant, and NRDC appealed.[15] The Ninth Circuit held that the Forest Service’s adoption of the plan was an arbitrary and capricious action in violation of the APA because the plan’s adoption ran counter to the evidence and the Forest Service failed to show that the mistake was a harmless error.[16] The Ninth Circuit also held that the EIS violated NEPA by misleading the public about the economic effects of the plan,[17] failing to consider alternatives based on correct market demand projections when the Forest Service was aware of the error,[18] and inadequately assessing the cumulative impact of past and reasonably foreseeable future non-federal logging.[19] The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the Forest Service’s projection error rendered its plan arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA and its EIS misleading and inadequate in violation of NEPA.[20]

Alaska Department of Health & Social Services v. Centers For Medicare & Medicaid Services

In Alaska Department of Health & Social Services v. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,[21] the Ninth Circuit held that the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) acted permissibly in denying the State of Alaska’s proposed amendment to alter federal reimbursement rates to Indian tribal health facilities.[22] The State petitioned for judicial review on the grounds that the decision was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.[23] The Ninth Circuit found that an agency rule is arbitrary and capricious if it relies on factors which Congress did not intend it to consider, fails to consider important aspects of the problem, acts inconsistently with the evidence before it, or is entirely implausible given agency expertise.[24] Here, the court held that CMS did not act arbitrarily or capriciously because the agency denied the State’s proposal on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the statutory requirement of efficiency, economy, and quality of care and it failed to comply with statutory upper payment limit regulations.[25] Thus, the court denied judicial review of the CMS Administrator’s final judgment denying the program amendments.[26]

Alaska Supreme Court

Grunert v. Alaska

In Grunert v. Alaska,[27] the supreme court invalidated a regulation that created a cooperative fishery and allocated a quota of salmon to the fishery.[28] Grunert, a fisherman, challenged the regulation, claiming that it exceeded the authority of the Alaska Board of Fishery, conflicted with the statutory definition of “fishery,” was inconsistent with the act’s purpose and policy, and was unconstitutional.[29] The superior court granted the State's motion for summary judgment upholding the validity and constitutionality of the regulation, and Grunert appealed.[30] The supreme court held that the regulation was invalid because it transformed the limited entry permit from a personal gear license into an ownership share in the cooperative fishery.[31] The supreme court further held that the regulation contradicted the statutory definition of "fishery" by allocating the same resources to both a cooperative and an open fishery using the same type of gear in the same area.[32] The supreme court reversed the superior court's grant of summary judgment, finding the regulation creating a cooperative fishery invalid, and remanded the case.[33]

Vroman v. City of Soldotna

In Vroman v. City of Soldotna,[34] the supreme court held that the de facto officer doctrine can confer validity on an improperly selected arbitrator when the arbitration is part of a municipal grievance procedure and not a collective bargaining agreement.[35] After Vroman was fired from the police department, he requested arbitration of his grievance regarding the termination.[36] Due to the unavailability of one of the original arbitrators, the mayor selected an alternate arbitrator but failed to get city counsel confirmation, as required by municipal code.[37] Vroman challenged the arbitration based on the procedural defect but the superior court denied the challenge.[38] Vroman appealed.[39] The supreme court held that Vroman did not waive his right to challenge the alternative arbitrator’s participation because he did not have a knowing intent to relinquish a right or privilege when he failed to object to the arbitrator’s presence during arbitration.[40] However, the supreme court held that the de facto officer doctrine — which confers validity on acts by officers with defects in their title — barred Vroman from arguing the arbitrator’s participation because the alternate had colorable authority due to his appointment by the mayor.[41] Moreover, the court held there was no indication that the original arbitration was unfair, and the arbitration was conducted on a municipal code provision and therefore did not violate private contract law.[42]

Fuller v. City of Homer

In Fuller v. City of Homer,[43] the supreme court held that a city is permitted to charge a fee for producing public documents but not for conducting a privilege review of the documents.[44] Fuller requested documents concerning an annexation of land from the City of Homer.[45] The city charged Fuller a fee for the production including time spent by the city manager for a privilege review.[46] Fuller appealed the superior court's granting of summary judgment to the city and its dismissal of her complaint.[47] She claimed error in the determination that the city was entitled to charge a fee for the privilege review and that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the time spent on the review and the amount charged for it.[48] The supreme court held that under relevant state statutes and city code provisions, the city was entitled to charge a fee for ministerial tasks related to the production of public records but that privilege review was not such a task and therefore could not be included in the fee determination.[49] The supreme court reversed the order of summary judgment and remanded for recalculation of the appropriate fee.[50]

Carlson v. Renkes

In Carlson v. Renkes,[51] the supreme court held that: 1) when an administrative agency issues a final decision, it must give notice of the 30-day appeal period[52] and 2) that the loss of an administrative record alone was not a violation of due process.[53] After an administrative hearing, the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) transferred Carlson, a prisoner, to Arizona.[54] Carlson objected and filed a pro se complaint in the superior court claiming due process violations and requesting a reparative injunction.[55] The superior court granted the State’s motion for dismissal for failure to state a claim, holding that Carlson was required to bring his claim as an administrative appeal, not a civil action, and that he lost the ability to do so because the thirty-day appeal period had passed.[56] Carlson appealed, arguing that the court erred in characterizing his complaint as an administrative appeal and that the loss of an audio tape of his hearing was a violation of due process.[57] The supreme court held the superior court’s treatment of the complaints as an administrative action was not in error because the statute Carlson sued under merely contained definitions and not a cause of action.[58] However, the supreme court found that the superior court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint because the DOC did not notify Carlson of his thirty-day limit for appeal.[59] Although the supreme court held that the loss of the hearing’s audio tape was not a violation of due process, it ordered that the superior court try to recreate Carlson’s administrative record on remand.[60] The supreme court vacated the order dismissing Carlson’s claim on the grounds that he was not properly notified of his thirty-day time limit and remanded with the stipulation that the superior court recreate his administrative record.[61]

Conkey v. State of Alaska, Department of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles

In Conkey v. State of Alaska, Department of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles,[62] the supreme court held that riding a towed snowmobile with limited steering ability constitutes operating a motor vehicle under Alaska law.[63] Conkey was arrested for driving while intoxicated while riding on a towed snowmobile.[64] The departmental hearing officer found by a preponderance of the evidence that there was probable cause to arrest Conkey for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and imposed a three-year revocation of Conkey’s driver’s license.[65] After the superior court affirmed the departmental officer’s findings, Conkey appealed, claiming that a snowmobile was not legally a motor vehicle and, in addition, he was not operating it when he was arrested. [66] The supreme court affirmed the departmental and superior court’s rulings that a towed snowmobile is a motor vehicle and Conkey’s limited steering of the towed snowmobile involved exercising control over the vehicle, which constitutes operating the vehicle.[67]

State, Department of Health & Social Services v. Valley Hospital Ass’n, Inc.

In State, Department of Health & Social Services v. Valley Hospital Ass’n, Inc.,[68] the supreme court found that a state agency’s determination of rates owed by a hospital was arbitrary and capricious.[69] The Alaska Department of Health and Social Services (“DHSS”), retroactively and without prior notice, enacted a deadline for the submission of information to be used in setting Medicaid reimbursement rates.[70] Even though DHSS had an accurate report of Valley Hospital’s Medicaid costs, the department refused to accept the report under the new deadline rule and instead relied on cost information that it knew to be inaccurate.[71] The superior court found the rate set by DHSS to be improper.[72] The supreme court affirmed, finding that DHSS’s reasons for using the erroneous data, in these circumstances, were so insubstantial as to constitute an abuse of discretion.[73] The court also found that DHSS should be left to determine a reasonable way to re-calculate the rate on its own.[74]

George Easley Co. v. Estate of John Lindekugel

In George Easley Co. v. Estate of John Lindekugel,[75] the supreme court held that the Alaska Worker's Compensation Board did not err in finding a company liable for an employee's injuries under the last injurious exposure rule and denying the company's requests for offsets to the award.[76] John Lindekugel suffered a work-related injury in 1976 that resulted in a permanent disability classification.[77] In 1981, after being cleared to work, Lindekugel suffered another work-related injury while employed by the George Easley Co.[78] The Worker's Compensation Board found Easley liable under the last injurious exposure rule which required that: (1) the employment related to the second injury aggravated or accelerated the first injury and (2) the employment was a legal cause or substantial factor in the disability.[79] The board also denied Easley's petitions to offset the award based on Lindekugel's social security benefits, his settlement with his first employer, and his legal malpractice settlement.[80] The superior court affirmed the board's findings, and Easley appealed.[81] The supreme court held that in workers’ compensation cases, there is a presumption of compensability when the employee has presented some evidence that work related activities could have aggravated or caused the employee's injuries.[82] To rebut that presumption, Easley would have to show that the injury was not caused by activities related to Lindekugel’s work at Easley or that there was no possibility of the employment causing the disability.[83] The supreme court held that the medical evidence presented by Easley was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of compensability.[84] The supreme court also held that Easley was not entitled to offsets relating to the earlier employment and legal malpractice settlements because they were related to questions of law and not of fact.[85] The supreme court further held that while the offset relating to social security benefits did involve a question of fact, the Worker's Compensation Board did not abuse its discretion in deciding Easley was not entitled to the offset.[86] The supreme court affirmed the decisions of the superior court and the Worker's Compensation Board holding that Easley was liable under the last injurious exposure rule and that it was not entitled to offsets due to the previous employment and legal malpractice settlements or the social security payments.[87]

Laidlaw Transit, Inc. v. Anchorage School District

In Laidlaw Transit, Inc. v. Anchorage School District,[88] the supreme court held that a transportation company’s action against a school district and another transportation company was properly treated as an administrative appeal;[89] that the district’s proceedings complied with due process;[90] and that there was a reasonable basis for finding that it was in the school district’s best interest to award the transportation contract to another company.[91] Laidlaw Transit and First Student, transportation companies, bid on a contract with Anchorage School District.[92] After First Student offered to match Laidlaw’s low proposal, the school district held a hearing to determine which transportation company would be in the district’s best interests.[93] When the district chose to give the contract to First Student, Laidlaw sued, alleging fraud and miscalculation.[94] The trial court converted this civil action to an administrative appeal and affirmed the board’s decision.[95] Laidlaw appealed.[96] The supreme court held that Laidlaw’s action was properly characterized as an administrative appeal since it was a challenge to the board’s decision.[97] Moreover, the court held that Laidlaw’s due process rights were not violated because the board hearing was not meant to resolve competing property interests and the board was not required to hear unlimited testimony or grant cross-examinations.[98] Finally, the court held that the board’s determination of best interest was reasonable because there was substantial evidence supporting the decision and the board had extensive discretion to award or not award the contract to any bidder.[99] Thus, the supreme court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.[100]

Lindhag v. State, Department of Natural Resources

In Lindhag v. State, Department of Natural Resources,[101] the supreme court held that the Alaska Worker’s Compensation Board’s (“the Board’s”) denial of benefits to an employee was supported by substantial evidence and that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the employee’s petition for modification.[102] Lindhag quit her job after her personal doctor advised her that the building she worked in was either exacerbating or causing a medical condition.[103] The Board agreed to pay Lindhag benefits for some symptoms but not for others, based largely on the findings of a Board-appointed physician.[104] After acquiring new evidence about her condition, Lindhag filed a petition for reconsideration, which the Board denied.[105] The supreme court upheld the Board’s decision to deny benefits because the Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence.[106] The court specifically found the Board, which had the sole power to determine witness credibility, had properly accorded more weight to the findings of the Board-appointed physician than Lindhag’s personal physician.[107] Further, the court held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Lindhag’s petition for rehearing and modification because the post-hearing evidence was presented without due diligence[108] and failed to offer any evidence of a change in her condition.[109] The supreme court thus affirmed the superior court’s decision to uphold the Board’s orders, holding that the partial denial of benefits was supported by substantial evidence and that the denial of the petition for rehearing was not in error.[110]

Business Law

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Alaska Supreme Court

Brown v. Dick

In Brown v. Dick,[111] the supreme court held that inadvertent violations of proxy disclosure requirements resulting from good-faith reliance on expert advice did not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty and did not per se require an award of nominal damages.[112]A group of dissident shareholders led by Brown complained of proxy violations in voting related to a controversial land transaction.[113] A consent decree entered by the Alaska Department of Community and Economic Development’s Division of Banking, Securities, and Corporations, confirmed that certain alleged proxy violations did occur but were inadvertent.[114] Brown claimed that the violations amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty and that he was entitled to nominal damages.[115] The superior court found no breach of fiduciary duty because the violations were based on good-faith reliance on expert advice and denied nominal damages.[116] The supreme court held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying nominal damages where the violations were inadvertent and based on good-faith reliance on expert advice.[117]

Harris v. Ahtna, Inc.

In Harris v. Ahtna, Inc.,[118] the supreme court held that a buy-or-sell contract between two shareholders did not comply with a shareholder agreement requiring such contracts to state an equal monetary price.[119] Under a shareholder agreement between Harris and Ahtna Inc. (“Ahtna”), each party could make a special offer to sell, forcing the other shareholder to either buy the offeror’s shares at the offered price or sell his own shares at the same price.[120] Ahtna made such an offer, providing a price per share as well as two other conditions, which required assumption of debt.[121] Harris agreed only to the price term, claiming that the debt assumption conditions were invalid under the agreement.[122] Ahtna claimed that this response obligated Harris to sell his shares.[123] The superior court issued a partial final judgment requiring Harris to sell his shares to Ahtna.[124] Harris appealed, arguing that the two assumption of debt terms violated the shareholder agreement because they constituted non-monetary price conditions that created price inequality depending on which shareholder was the seller, and that he was entitled to specific performance to buy the shares based on the price term agreement.[125] The supreme court held that the buy-or-sell contract could not contain non-monetary conditions and that there must be price equality regardless of who buys or sells.[126] However, Harris’ acceptance of the price term alone did not create an enforceable contract allowing specific performance because Ahtna’s offer was merely conditional.[127] The supreme court reversed the partial final judgment and remanded the case, holding that the buy-or-sell contract violated the agreement’s requirement of equal price and preclusion of non-monetary conditions and that Harris was not entitled to specific performance.[128]

Deaver v. Auction Block Co.

In Deaver v. Auction Block Co.,[129] the supreme court held that a fish auctioneer who issued a fisherman a fish ticket was the primary fish buyer.[130] Deaver, a commercial fisherman, received a fish ticket from Auction Block in return for his catch.[131] The ticket listed Auction Block as the buyer and specified the price of the catch, but Auction Block paid Deaver less than the specified price.[132] Deaver filed suit for breach of contract and the superior court dismissed his claims, finding that Auction Block was merely an auctioneer and not a buyer.[133] The supreme court held that because Auction Block issued its own fish ticket to Deaver, it was the buyer of the fish.[134] The court reasoned that a primary fish buyer who is the initial recipient of fish cannot avoid its statutory duty under state law to post surety bond to secure payment to fishers simply because it had a contractual duty to act as an auctioneer.[135] Also, because Auction Block accepted the fish within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code, it was contractually bound to pay Deaver the specified amount.[136] The supreme court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings on Deaver’s breach of contract claim, holding that Auction Block was the primary fish buyer.[137]

Hall v. TWS, Inc.

In Hall v. TWS, Inc.,[138] the supreme court held that a creditor could foreclose on its interest in a business venture because it was not a tenancy in partnership.[139] Hall and Moore purchased a mining operation together.[140] Hall subsequently filed for bankruptcy.[141] After that, Moore’s interest was assigned to TWS,and TWS moved to foreclose on its interest.[142] The supreme court held that, although a partnership was formed, the subsequent bankruptcy dissolved the partnership, making the mining operation a tenancy in common.[143] Moreover, no new partnership agreement was formed after the bankruptcy.[144] Thus, the supreme court held that the business venture was a tenancy in common rather than a tenancy in partnership and TWS could foreclose on its interest.[145]

OK Lumber Co. v. Alaska Railroad Corp.

In OK Lumber Co. v. Alaska Railroad Corp.[146], the supreme court held that an arbitrator’s ruling on the fair market value of land was within the scope of arbitration.[147] OK Lumber leased land from the Alaska Railroad Corporation with the rent tied to the fair market value of the property.[148] The parties agreed to arbitrate disputes as to the fair market value of the property. [149] OK Lumber argued that the arbitrator exceeded his authority when he added a factor to the determination of fair market value that was not in the contract.[150] The supreme court held that the language of the contract allowed the arbitrator to arbitrate any disagreement over fair market value and further held that arbitrators’ findings of facts are unreviewable, even in the case of gross error.[151] The supreme court therefore affirmed the superior court’s decision to uphold the arbitrator’s determination.[152]

Civil Procedure

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Alaska Supreme Court

Catalina Yachts v. Pierce

In Catalina Yachts v. Pierce,[153] the supreme court held that a sailboat seller was entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs incurred when its pre-trial settlement offer was rejected and the jury returned a judgment less favorable to the offeree.[154] The Pierces bought a new sailboat from Catalina Yachts and sued when Catalina refused to replace the damaged hull under the warranty.[155] While the jury found in favor of the Pierces, the total of the jury award plus attorneys’ fees and costs was less than Catalina’s pre-trial offer, which the Pierces had rejected.[156] Catalina then filed a motion for post-offer fees under Alaska Civil Rule 68.[157] The superior court denied this motion and a motion for reconsideration, holding that Rule 68 did not apply because it was preempted by federal law.[158] Catalina appealed.[159] The supreme court held that the Rule 68 requirement that an offeree pay attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by the offeror when the offeree receives a judgment that is less favorable than the pre-trial offer is mandatory and is not conditioned on any other rule.[160] In addition, the court held that Rule 68 is not in conflict with the federal law and does not hinder its purpose.[161] The supreme court reversed and remanded the case to determine the fees and costs to which Catalina was entitled.[162]

Morgan v. Fortis Benefits Insurance Co.

In Morgan v. Fortis Benefits Insurance Co.,[163] the supreme court held that the trial court properly granted summary judgment for an insurer on the basis that a decedent’s death fell under her policy’s intoxication exclusion.[164] The decedent was driving with a blood alcohol level well above the legal limit, when her car ran off the road causing her death.[165] The insurer, Fortis, claimed that the decedent’s death fell under the policy’s intoxication exclusion, because the death was caused either directly or indirectly by the decedent’s intoxication.[166] The trial court granted summary judgment for Fortis.[167] On appeal, the supreme court held that summary judgment was properly granted because the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence was that the decedent’s accident and death were at least indirectly caused by her intoxication.[168] The supreme court applied the standard of construing grants of insurance coverage broadly, and exclusions narrowly, in favor of the insured.[169] Thus, the supreme court affirmed the superior court, holding that the policy’s intoxication exclusion applied.[170]

Phillips v. Gieringer

In Phillips v. Gieringer,[171] the supreme court held that notice of a complaint and knowledge of a mistake made on a complaint may be imputed to a defendant through the defendant’s insurance company.[172] Phillips filed a suit against Carl Gieringer after the two were involved in an automobile accident but mistakenly identified Carl’s father, Robert Gieringer, as the defendant.[173] Phillips amended the complaint to properly identify Carl as the defendant after the statute of limitations had run, prompting the superior court to dismiss the complaint. [174] The supreme court held that because Carl and Robert shared the same insurance plan and Phillips had sent the insurance company a copy of the complaint, there was a presumption that notice was imputed to Carl.[175] Moreover, the supreme court held that the insurance company knew or should have known that Phillips meant to identify Carl as the defendant.[176] Thus, the supreme court reversed the superior court’s dismissal of the complaint.[177]

Kaiser v. Umialik Insurance

In Kaiser v. Umialik Insurance,[178] the supreme court held that improperly asserted equitable estoppel and equitable tolling arguments do not remedy a claim filed after the statute of limitations had run.[179] On appeal from the denial of a bad faith claim against an insurer, Kaiser claimed that equitable estoppel or equitable tolling allowed him to file a claim after the statute of limitations had run.[180] In affirming the lower court’s ruling, the supreme court held that Kaiser had waived his claim to equitable estoppel because he did not raise the issue in the superior court[181] and dismissed the claim of equitable tolling because Kaiser did not undergo any extraordinary circumstances that would justify the claim.[182]

DeNardo v. Calista Corp.

In DeNardo v. Calista Corp.,[183] the supreme court held that where a stipulated dismissal preserved a plaintiff’s claims, neither res judicata nor the doctrine against claim splitting barred a subsequent action.[184] DeNardo filed lawsuits in state and federal court against Calista based on the same facts.[185] The state court lawsuit was removed to federal court and consolidated with the federal court lawsuit.[186] The state claims were then remanded and subsequently voluntarily dismissed by the parties.[187] The federal court then dismissed the federal court claims.[188] DeNardo then filed a third lawsuit in superior court based on the same facts as alleged in the first state lawsuit.[189] The superior court dismissed the claims, relying on res judicata and the doctrine against claim splitting, and DeNardo appealed.[190] The supreme court held that res judicata based on stipulated dismissal does not bar causes of actions expressly reserved for future adjudication.[191] Here, the dismissal of the state claims alleged to be with prejudice were actually without prejudice because they expressly preserved all claims pending in federal court (which were included in the state lawsuit).[192] The court also found that the federal court dismissal did not rule on the merits of the non-federal claims and therefore did not preclude claims brought in the third lawsuit.[193] The claim splitting argument was also rejected because the third lawsuit raised only claims that were brought up in the first state action.[194] Therefore, the court vacated the order dismissing the complaint and remanded the case, holding that the claims in DeNardo’s third lawsuit were not barred.[195]

Monzingo v. Alaska Air Group

In Monzingo v. Alaska Air Group,[196] the supreme court held that a non-prevailing plaintiff filing a class-action suit is not liable for attorneys’ fees solely related to class certification and notice.[197] Monzingo sued Alaska Airlines based on an individual claim and elected to be the named plaintiff in a class action claim.[198] The supreme court held that a non-prevailing plaintiff should only pay attorneys’ fees related to the individual merits of his or her own claim and not fees related to a class action.[199] The court further held that allowing the threat of additional liability for attorneys’ fees would hamper the policy behind Rule 82 by discouraging plaintiffs from acting as class representatives.[200] Thus, the policy behind Rule 82 does not support imposing attorneys’ fees on a named plaintiff when those fees involve class action preparation that falls outside the substantive merits of the plaintiff’s individual case.[201] Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment but vacated the fee award and remanded for a determination of the appropriate award.[202]

Rockstad v. Erikson

In Rockstad v. Erikson,[203] the supreme court upheld the trial court’s summary judgment decisions and its decisions on damages but vacated an award of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in litigation outside the province of the state court.[204] A jury found Rockstad liable for failure to repay a loan that was secured by a note and a deed of trust on his home.[205] Rockstad appealed the superior court’s ruling on his statute of limitations and usury defenses,[206] its decision to allow judicial foreclosure of his house, and its award of attorneys’ fees.[207] The supreme court held that there is no mandatory obligation to grant summary judgment even when such a motion is unopposed because undisputed facts could oppose the motion.[208] The court also held that the statue of limitations determination could not be appealed because Rockstad introduced evidence during trial that defeated his statute of limitations claim.[209] With respect to the superior court’s ruling on Rockstad’s usury defense, the supreme court held that there was no violation of the usury statute because the plain language of the loan note indicated that there was only one loan for $26,000, which is above the $25,000 limit established in the statute.[210] Considering the five factors of quasi-estoppel, the court concluded that judicial foreclosure was appropriate because the doctrine of quasi-estoppel applied to enforce the deed of trust.[211] Finally, the court held that the trial court’s award to Erikson of full attorneys’ fees was appropriate because it was pursuant to the terms of the note and deed.[212] However, the award cannot include attorneys’ fees incurred in Rockstad’s bankruptcy litigation because it was outside the province of the state court and solely in the power of the federal bankruptcy court to make such an award.[213]

In the Matter of Kristine A. Schmidt

In In the Matter of Kristine A. Schmidt,[214] the supreme court held that an order assessing attorneys’ fees and costs may be upheld where it explains the basis for the sanction, even if it does not cite a violation of a specific rule in the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure.[215] The superior court issued an order granting Schmidt’s motion to accept a late-filed brief and directing her to pay attorneys’ fees for the opposing party’s reply brief and then issued a subsequent order again denying the motion and ordering her to pay additional attorneys’ fees.[216] Schmidt appealed, arguing that the superior court must specify a violation of a Rule of Civil Procedure before awarding attorneys’ fees.[217] Moreover, she argued that she did not violate any Rule, and that she did not receive notice before being fined for the late brief.[218] The supreme court held that an order assessing attorney’s fees may be upheld even if it does not cite a Rule of Civil Procedure violated if the basis for the sanction is still discernible from the order.[219] Moreover, Schmidt violated Rules that require litigants to follow court-set deadlines, and any notice deficiency was cured by her opportunity to move for reconsideration.[220] However, the supreme court held that the superior court abused its discretion in issuing the second order because it did not explain its